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I. INTRODUCTION
"There shall be a district court of appeal serving each appellate district
[of Florida]."'
"The laws of [Florida] ... shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil2
actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply."
The Rules of Decision Act,3 the principles of the Erie doctrine,4 and
the Constitution of the United States require that federal courts apply state
law in many situations. Perhaps the most familiar of these situations is one
in which federal jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship. Moreover,

1.
2.
3.
4.

FLA. CONST. art. V, § 4(a).
Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988).
Id.
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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state property law may be applied in cases in federal courts dealing with
federal tax consequences.5 State law may determine the content of a
federal right in actions arising under bankruptcy law,6 or in copyright law,7
even though the federal courts' jurisdiction in such cases is exclusive.8
The "laws of the several states" that are to "be regarded as rules of
decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where
they apply,"9 include not only state constitutions and legislative enactments
but also judicial decisions.'" The process by which a federal court determines the content of state law on a particular issue has been discussed in
numerous federal decisions and secondary commentaries."
Where the
source of applicable state law is a state constitution or statute the process
may not be difficult. 2 Where the highest court of a state has spoken
clearly on a matter of state common law, the process may not be difficult.
Where the only source of state law is a decision or decisions of one or more
state intermediate appellate courts, the process is quite difficult. How does
and should a federal court proceed when attempting to ascertain "the law of
Florida" when the only source of that law is from one or more of Florida's
District Courts of Appeal? How do the structure of the Florida judiciary
and the precedential value accorded by Florida state courts to district court
decisions affect federal courts' application of Florida law? Where the
Florida district courts of appeal disagree within or among themselves, is
there a "law of Florida" on point, or is Florida comprised of several substates with different laws on the same subject applying in different
geographical areas of Florida? For that matter, how are Florida trial courts
or courts of appeal to decide what is Florida law when faced with conflicting precedent? Where federal courts must apply unsettled Florida law, is
certification by the eleventh circuit to the Supreme Court of Florida the final
or appropriate solution? Should the Florida Constitution be amended to
provide for more uniformity of state law?
The authors will explore these questions. We presuppose a working

5. E.g., Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967); Blair v. Commissioner,
300 U.S. 5, 8-10 (1937).
6. In re Erickson, 815 F.2d 1090, 1091-95 (7th Cir. 1987).
7. De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956).
8. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334, 1338 (1988).
9. Id. § 1652.
10. Erie, 304 U.S. at 64.
11. See CHARLES A. WRIGHT., THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 58 (4th ed. 1983) and
sources cited therein.
12. Of course, state judicial decisions interpreting state constitutions or statutes may
create the same problems as pure state common law.
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knowledge of the general concept of stare decisis, used here synonymously
with precedent, as the principle that a court will stand by its own decisions
as well as by those of a higher court in a given judicial hierarchy. 13 Yet
the modem concept of stare decisis does not mean that a point of law once
decided is settled for all time. Stare decisis simply means that a decision
will be followed, distinguished, or overruled by the deciding or coordinate
court, as well as followed by lower courts in the same judicial system (until
that decision is reversed or overruled by a higher court).
Part II will explain the structure of the Florida judiciary and set forth
the status quo in terms of the precedential value accorded by Florida courts
to decisions of the Florida District Courts of Appeal. Part III will examine
the general "Erie" problem, including the early history of the doctrine and
the doctrine as it was later reformed. The choice of law and forum
shopping issues raised by the Erie doctrine will be examined not only as to
interstate choice of law issues, but also as to intrastate choice of law. We
will analyze a remarkable-debate between two federal judges in Illinois that
raised problems pertinent to Florida federal judges and litigants. Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit position regarding how federal judges should
determine the content of Florida law will be discussed. Part IV will
recommend amendment of article V, section 4, of the Florida Constitution
to achieve statewide precedential effect for the decisions of the courts of
appeal.

13. The full phrase is stare decisis et non quieta movere: "[tlo adhere to precedents, and
not to unsettle things which are established." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1406 (6th ed.
1990). "This doctrine embodies a judicial policy that a 'determination of a point of law by
a court will generally be followed by a court of the same . . . rank if a subsequent case
presents the same legal problem, although different parties are involved in the subsequent
case."' Brewer's Dairy v. Dolloff, 268 A.2d 636, 638 (Me. 1970) (quoting 20 AM. JUR. 2D
Courts § 183 (1966)).

The Supreme Court of the United States gives several reasons for the policy of
adhering to precedents:
Among these are the desirability that the law furnish a clear guide for the
conduct of individuals, to enable them to plan their affairs with assurance against
untoward surprise; the importance of furthering fair and expeditious adjudication
by eliminating the need to relitigate every relevant proposition inevery case; and
the necessity of maintaining public faith in the judiciary as a source of
impersonal and reasoned judgments.
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970).
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II. STARE DECISIS:

FLORIDA COURTS' TREATMENT OF DECISIONS
OF DISTRICT COURTS OF APPEAL

A. Structure of the FloridaJudicial System
The Florida District Courts of Appeal have been constitutionally separate, distinct courts 4 since 1956, when the constitution first authorized
appellate level of the state judiciary." In contrast to states with a unitary
system comprising a single intermediate appellate court sitting in districts,
divisions, or panels, Florida's judicial structure is analogous to the federal
judicial system, with separate courts of appeal.' 6 There are five district
courts of appeal, with headquarters in Tallahassee (First District), Lakeland
(Second District), Dade County (Third District), Palm Beach County (Fourth
District), and Daytona Beach (Fifth District). 7 Each district court of
appeal has its own chief judge," its own clerk,' 9 its own marshal, 20 and
its own official identifying seal.2' The geography of the five appellate
districts is shown on a map at appendix A to this article.
The foundation for understanding the Florida judicial system is the
recognition of its uniqueness. In many respects, the district courts of appeal
are courts of last resort, not intermediate appellate courts,22 because the
jurisdiction of the supreme court to review district court decisions is
extremely limited.23 The supreme court's mandatory jurisdiction to review
14. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 4(a) provides: "There shall be a district court of appeal
serving each appellate district."
15. Id. § I (amended 1956).
16.

See generally MARLIN 0. OsTHus & MAYO H. STIEGLER, STATE INTERMEDIATE

12-15 (1980) (discussing structure of intermediate appellate courts).
§ 35.05 (1991).
18. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(c); FLA. STAT. § 35.12 (1991).
19. FLA. CONST, art. V, § 4(c); FLA. STAT. § 35.21 (1991).
20. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 4(c); FLA. STAT. § 35.26 (1991).
21. FLA. STAT. § 35.09 (1991). "Each district court of appeal shall have an official
identifying seal as prescribed by the supreme court." Id.
22. "The jurisdictional structure of Florida's appellate courts is unique." State v.
Bamber, 592 So. 2d 1129, 1132 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991),jurisdictionaccepted,602So.
2d 942 (Fla. 1992).
23. Jenkins v. State, 385 So. 2d 1356, 1363 (Fla. 1980) (England, C.J., concurring
specially); Ben F. Overton, DistrictCourts of Appeal: Courts of FinalJurisdictionwith Two
New Responsibilities-AnExpanded Power to Certify Questionsand Authority to Sit En Banc,
35 U. FLA. L. REV. 80, 80 n.5 (1983); John M. Scheb, Florida's Courts of Appeal:
Intermediate Courts Become Final, 13 STETSON L. REV. 479, 480 (1984); see generally
Taylor Mattis, Stare DecisisAmong and Within Florida'sDistrictCourts of Appeal, 18 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 143 (1990) [hereinafter Mattis, Stare Decisis Florida](discussing Florida's

APPELLATE COURTS
17. FLA. STAT.
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district court decisions is limited to decisions declaring invalid a state statute
or a provision of the state constitution.24 The supreme court's discretionary jurisdiction to review district court decisions is limited by article V,
sections 3(b)(3) and (b)(4) of the Florida Constitution, which provide that
the supreme court:
(3) May review any decision of a district court of appeal that expressly
declares valid a state statute, or that expressly construes a provision of
the state or federal constitution, or that expressly affects a class of
constitutional or state officers, or that expressly and directly conflicts
with a decision of another district court of appeal or of the supreme
court on the same question of law.
(4) May review any decision of a district court of appeal that passes
upon a question certified by it to be of great public importance, or that
is certified by it to be in direct conflict with a decision of another
district court of appeal.2"

A district court of appeal that renders a decision in conflict with that of
another district court may prevent review by the supreme court by declining
to state or "express" in the opinion that the decision "directly" conflicts (for
(b)(3) jurisdiction), or declining to certify that the decision is in "direct
conflict" (for (b)(4) jurisdiction).26 Furthermore, a decision of a district
court creates precedent. As one district court opinion said, "[w]e are one
state with five districts, each of which is authorized to separately evaluate
the merits of various legal rules and create legal precedent."27
The Supreme Court of Florida has recognized the precedent-creating
function of district courts of appeal: "[T]he decisions of the district courts
of appeal represent the law of Florida unless and until they are overruled by

unique appellate court structure).
24. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(1).
25. Id. § 3(b)(3), (b)(4) (emphasis added).
26. Victor Lance, Note, The District Courts of Appeal-After 1980 Jurisdictional
Amendment: A New Obligation Toward Decisional Harmony, 6 NOVA L. REV. 115 (1981);
see generally Arthur J. England, Jr., et al., Constitutional Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
of Florida: 1980 Reform, 32 U. FLA. L. REV. 147 (1980) (discussing the features of the
amendment). "Section 3(b)(3) now places an increased obligation on district court judges
who again have some ability to control a party's right to supreme court review." Id. at 181.
27. Bamber, 592 So. 2d at 1132.
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this Court .. ."" The operation of district court decisions as precedent
must be examined from two perspectives: (1) because the precedentcreating courts are multiple, not unitary, their decisions must be examined
on a horizontal plane. Is the decision of one district court of appeal binding
on another?; (2) because the precedent-creating courts sit in separate
districts, their decisions must be examined on a vertical plane. On what

courts below a district court of appeal is its decision binding?
B. Horizontal Stare Decisis
The freedom of a district court of appeal to disregard the decision of
a "sister" district court is well established among the district courts 29 and
approved in dicta by the supreme court." A refusal to accept coordinate
precedent may follow a hat-tipping statement that the coordinate court's
decision is "entitled to great weight,"'" or a less deferential statement that
the decision is "merely persuasive. 3 2 But the bottom line over the years
consistently has been that district courts are not bound and decline to follow

other district court decisions.

This is not to say that one district never

follows the decisions of another. Rather, the district courts have followed

28. Stanfill v. State, 384 So. 2d 141, 143 (Fla. 1980). The Stanfill court cited Johnsv.
Wainwright, 253 So. 2d 873, 874 (Fla. 1971), and Ansin v. Thurston, 101 So. 2d 808, 810
(Fla. 1958), which state that district courts were never intended to be intermediate courts and
that district court decisions are, typically, final and absolute. The Stanfill phrase in the text
was quoted in Weiman v. McHaffie, 470 So. 2d 682, 684 (Fla. 1985), and most recently in
Pardo v. State, 596 So. 2d 665, 666 (Fla. 1992).
29. Cases cited and discussed in Mattis, Stare Decisis Florida, supra note 23, at 150
n.38. More recent cases refusing to follow a conflicting decision of a coordinate district
court include: State v. Dorian, 619 So. 2d 311, 313 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993); State v.
Agee, 588 So. 2d 600 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1991), decision approved, 622 So. 2d 473 (Fla.
1993); State v. Bamber, 592 So. 2d 1129, 1132 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 199 1),]urisdiction
accepted,602 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 1992), disagreedwith, State v. Thomas, 604 So. 2d 1277 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Pardo, 582 So. 2d 1225, 1227 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1991), approved in part and quashed in part, 596 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1992); Pimm v. Pimm,
568 So. 2d 1299, 1300 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) ("declin[ing] to follow" Third District
decision, case certified as of great public importance), decision approved, 601 So. 2d 534
(Fla. 1992); Durham v. Palm Court, Inc., 558 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), appeal
dismissed sub nom. Forster v. Durham, 566 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1990); Dealers Ins. Co. v. Jon
Hall Chevrolet Co., 547 So. 2d 325, 326 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
30. Weiman, 470 So. 2d at 684.
31. E.g., Spencer Ladd's, Inc. v. Lehman, 167 So. 2d 731, 735 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.
1964), modified on other grounds, 182 So. 2d 402 (Fla. 1965).
32. E.g., McDonald's Corp. v. Department of Transp., 535 So. 2d 323, 325 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
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cases from other districts that they deemed persuasive and have rejected
cases with which they disagreed without any suggestion that the later
decision overrules the earlier. 33 The "law of the district" notion is as entrenched in Florida as is the "law of the circuit" in the federal system. The
perceived safety net is the supreme court's discretionary jurisdiction to
resolve conflicts between districts, should an aggrieved party so choose and
be financially able to seek such review. A wise man once cautioned that
rules recognizing the existence of conflicts among intermediate courts as a
ground for review by a top court "were designed to eliminate conflicts, not
to stimulate them. 34
The supreme court has said little about conflicts among districts, but in
1985 the court implied that a decision of one district does not bind another.
The court said that a district court's opinion has "a binding effect on all
'35
Florida trial courts [but] . . .a persuasive effect on sister district courts.
More recently, the supreme court quoted with approval a district court's
statement that "a sister district's opinion is merely persuasive. 36
C. Vertical Stare Decisis
Fundamental to the operation of a common-law judicial system is the
trial courts' understanding of what precedent they must follow. For thirtysix years after Florida initiated a three-tiered judicial structure, no clear
statewide authority existed on the issue of which trial courts were bound by
which appellate decisions; however, in 1992, the supreme court spoke
directly and laid the matter to rest, at least partially.37 All Florida trial
courts are bound by the decision of any district court that does not conflict
with another district court decision.38 If the court of appeal of the district
in which the trial court sits has decided the issue, the trial court is bound to
follow its rule, whether or not the rule conflicts with a decision of another
district court.39 Still unanswered is what course of action a trial court
should take where other district courts are in conflict on an issue and the

33. See supra note 29.
34. Walter Schaefer, Foreword: Stare Decisis and the "Law of the Circuit," 28 DE

PAUL L. REV. 565, 566 (1979). Walter Schaefer is a former Justice of the Supreme Court
of Illinois.
35. Weiman, 470 So. 2d at 684.
36, Pardo, 596 So. 2d at 667 (quoting State v. Hayes, 333 So. 2d 51, 53 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1976).

37, Id.at 665.
38. Id.at 666.
39. Id.at 666-67.
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trial court's own district is undecided.
In 1976, twenty years after the constitutional revision establishing the
district courts of appeal,40 the Fourth District Court of Appeal first
addressed the issue of vertical stare decisis. 4 1 In State v. Hayes,4 2 Chief
Judge Walden "flatly stat[ed] that a Circuit Court wheresoever situate [sic]
in Florida is equally bound by a decision of a District Court of Appeal
regardless of its appellate district," absent a conflicting decision from the
trial court's own court of appeal.43 Later that same year, the First District
Court of Appeal reached the opposite result in Smith v. Venus Condominium
Ass'n,44 holding that trial courts are bound only by decisions of the court
of appeal of the district in which the trial courts are located.45 Chief Judge
Boyer, in Venus Condominium, reasoned that requiring trial courts to follow
decisions of sister courts of appeal "could lead to utter chaos were two of
our sister courts to be in conflict on a point of law raised in a trial court in
this district."46 He further pointed out that it would be "anomalous" for
the First District Court of Appeal to reverse a trial court's decision not to
follow a decision of a sister district court with which the First District Court
disagreed.47
The opinions in Hayes and Venus Condominium reveal jurisprudential
differences about the appropriate function of trial judges. Chief Judge
Walden in Hayes emphasized that in order to preserve harmony, stability,
and predictability in the law, trial courts must follow the holdings of higher
courts.48 Chief Judge Boyer in Venus Condominium commented: "The
fact is that trial courts, as appellate courts, have the duty and obligation to
follow [determine] and apply the law."49
Interestingly, the two conflicting district courts attempted to facilitate

40. FLA. CONST. art. V, §§ 1, 4.
41. Hayes, 333 So. 2d at 51.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 52-53.
44. 343 So. 2d 1284 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976), quashed and remanded on other
grounds, 352 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 1977) (stating nothing on the stare decisis point). Venus
Condominium rejected the idea of a trial court's being bound by decisions of other district
courts as "novel, though without merit." Id. at 1285. Hayes, decided six months earlier, was
not mentioned.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Hayes, 333 So. 2d at 52.
49. Venus Condominium, 343 So. 2d at 1285.
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supreme court review in each of the cases."
Hayes the court said:

In the earlier opinion of

Since the state suggests that there is confusion and uncertainty
abroad among the circuit courts as to whether they are bound to follow
the decision of a foreign District Court of Appeal (a suggestion which
surprises us), and since under that rationale Circuit Courts in the First,
Second and Third Appellate Districts would not feel bound by this
instant decision, we do hereby offer upon appropriate applicationto
certify the question contained in Point I as being one of great public
interest.5'
In the later opinion of Venus Condominium, on petition for rehearing, the
court certified that the decision passed upon a question of great public
interest.52 There is no subsequent history of the Hayes decision; however,
the supreme court did review the Venus Condominium decision without
commenting upon the stare decisis conflict with Hayes.53 It is folly to
assume that a conflict once created between or among districts will soon be
resolved by the supreme court. Some reasons for failure to resolve conflicts
are that: (1) parties run out of money or energy to litigate further; 4 (2)
they settle the dispute; or, (3) the supreme court refuses discretionary review
or does not address the pertinent conflict.
During the next sixteen years, the conflict persisted about which trial
courts were bound by which appellate decisions. The First District Court
remained firm in its position that trial courts within the first appellate district
were bound only by First District Court decisions and those of the supreme

50. Id.; Hayes, 333 So. 2d at 51.
51. Hayes, 333 So. 2d at 54.
52. Venus Condominium, 343 So. 2d at 1287 (referring to the substantive issue of the
case).
53. Smith v. Venus Condominium Ass'n, 352 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 1977). The supreme
court accepted conflict jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(3) ofthe Florida Constitution
based on interdistrict conflict on the substantive point. Id. at 1170.
54. In his concurring opinion, Justice Adknis stated:
The district courts of appeal are frequently expressly recognizing in opinions that
a decision is in conflict with a sister district court. Unless one of the parties
brings a petition for certiorari to ... [the supreme court] the conflict remains in
the reported case law and the trial judge is faced with the dilemma of selecting
one of two conflicting district courts of appeal decisions as the proper case law.
The Florida Bar Re: Rules of Appellate Procedure, 463 So. 2d 1114, 1124 (Fla. 1984)
(Adkins, J., concurring).
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court. 5 The Second5 6 and Fifth57 Districts joined the Fourth District"
in requiring trial courts to follow a decision of any district court where there
was no conflicting district decision. In 1992, the Third District joined the
First District in refusing to require trial courts to follow any but their "own"
district decisions. 9 In Pardo, the trial court concluded that it was required
to exclude a child victim's hearsay statements under the authority of a Fifth
601
District decision" with which
the trial court disagreed. 6' Judge Cope,
writing for the Third District Court of Appeal, opined that the trial court
was under no obligation to follow decisions of districts other than the Third.
55. Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc. v. Smith, 480 So. 2d 1366, 1366 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1985), affd, 497 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 1986) (stating nothing on the stare decisis
point). The trial court sitting in the First District, where there was no decision on point, was
held to have acted correctly in rejecting recent, consistent Second and Third District cases.
Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, 497 So. 2d at 646.
56. Chapman v. Pinellas County, 423 So. 2d 578, 580 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1982); In
re E.B.L., 544 So. 2d 333, 336 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989); cf State v, Kopulos, 413 So.
2d 1195 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that trial courts must follow the decisions of
the district court in their territorial district where those decisions conflict with other district
decisions); State v. Bamber, 592 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991), jurisdiction
accepted, 602 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 1992); Pimm v. Pimm, 568 So. 2d 1299, 1132 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1990), decision approved, 601 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 1992).
57. Dillon v. Chapman, 404 So. 2d 354, 359 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981), rev'don
other grounds, 415 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1982); Dealers Ins. Co. v. Jon Hall Chevrolet Co., 547
So. 2d 325, 326 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (noting that the trial judge acted correctly in
following a decision of the Third District, but reversing the judgment because the Fifth
District disagreed with that holding). In Jon Hall Chevrolet, the Fifth District expressly
noted a direct conflict with the Third District on a question of statutory interpretation and
constitutionality. Id. at 326-27. There is no subsequent history of the case.
58. Recent expressions of the position of the Fourth District are Durham v. Palm Court,
Inc., 558 So. 2d 59, 60 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), appeal dismissed sub nom. Forster v.
Durham, 566 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1990), which explained "[t]he Fourth District Court had not
spoken on this subject, and thus the trial court was bound by the First District's Gordon case
.... On the other hand, we are not bound by the Gordon decision and, in fact, we disagree
with it .... " and Dean v. Dean, 607 So. 2d 494, 499 n.6 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992),
review dismissed, 618 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 1993), which explained "[i]n the absence of
controlling precedent from its own district court, any trial court in Florida, irrespective of the
district in which it sits, is required to follow the decision of any other district court of appeal
in Florida."
59. State v. Pardo, 582 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991), approved in part,
quashed in part, 596 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1992).
60. Kopko v. State, 577 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991), quashed by Pardo
v. State, 596 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1992). Kopko excluded the child victim's hearsay statements,
even though they satisfied Florida Statutes section 90.803(23), because the child was able to
testify fully at trial. Id. at 962.
61. Pardo, 582 So. 2d at 1226.
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[D]ecisions of other district courts of appeal should be treated by trial
courts in the same way that this court treats such decisions: as
persuasive authority, Such decisions are deserving of careful consideration by trial courts in this district, but are not binding on them ....
The trial court's ultimate obligation is to ascertain and follow the
law. The interests of justice are best served where trial judges have the
opportunity and responsibility to reach a reasoned decision after
consideration of all pertinent authority. In the present case there were
sound reasons to disagree
with the Kopko decision, and the trial court
62

was entitled to do

so.

The Second District Court was aware that the Third District had just
freed its circuit courts to disregard precedent of other districts, when the
Second District decided Bamber.63 The Second District used Bamber to
"reaffirm [its] . . . conviction that the circuit courts within the Second
District must obey controlling precedent from the other districts."64 A
footnote following this quotation revealed how potentially divisive the issue
of vertical stare decisis had become:
Ironically, we reaffirm this belief by requiring our circuit courts to
follow a controlling precedent of the Third District, even though its
circuit courts are now free to disregard the otherwise controlling
precedent of this court. It has been suggested, perhaps facetiously, that
we should limit . . .[the Second District rule] so that circuit courts in
the Second District need only obey precedent from districts that
recognize the precedential effect of our reported cases. We decline to
create such a rule of inter-district renvoi. Hopefully, the formalized
rules governing conflicts of law can be limited to conflicts between
states.65

Judge Altenbernd, writing for Bamber, supported the decision for
broadcast vertical stare decisis on the bases of Florida's judicial structure
and the appropriate functioning of the tri-level courts within that state
structure.6 6 The judge pointed out that Florida is one state, albeit with five
districts. 67 The judge further noted that district courts do create precedent,
and if they create conflicts in the process the supreme court can resolve

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.at 1227.
592 So. 2d at 1129.
Id.at 1132.
Id.at 1132 n.2.
Id.at 1132.
Id.
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them.68 However, the function of trial courts is not to create precedent.69
A trial court's ruling is not
binding, even in the adjacent courtroom.... [N]o... [constitutional]
mechanism exists to resolve conflicts among hundreds of circuit court
judges. .

.

. [A] system in which trial courts were not bound by the

only Florida precedent on a question of law would be a system
promoting the rule of individual judges rather than the rule of law. At
best, it would tend to create five balkanized districts confederated into
a loose Floridian union.7"
The court further stated:
Floridians need to know, to the greatest extent possible, that trial courts
will apply the same law in Pensacola, Tampa, and Miami. Trial judges
are free to vigorously express their disagreement with controlling
precedent from other districts, but a workable system of jurisprudence
requires that they obey that precedent until their district creates
conflicting precedent.7'
Once again, Pardo and Bamber reveal jurisprudential differences about
the appropriate function of trial judges. Judge Altenbernd in Bamber, like
Chief Judge Walden in Hayes, emphasized that in order to preserve
harmony, stability, and predictability in the law, trial courts must follow the
holdings of higher courts. Judge Cope in Pardo, like Chief Judge Boyer in
Venus Condominium, expressed that trial judges should reach their own
reasoned decision, influenced by but without constraint from decisions of
other districts. The approach in Bamber tends toward a communitarian
model, emphasizing responsibility to the state judicial system as a whole, as
central to the realization of equal justice, even where the intellectual
proclivities of the individual judge may run contrary to a specific result.
The approach in Pardo tends toward rugged individualism, positing that the
ultimate good will result through decision-making according to the lights of

68. Bamber, 592 So. 2d at 1132. But cf supra text accompanying note 54.
69. Bamber, 592 So. 2d at 1132.
70. Id.
71. Id. The Second District Court went on to affirm the trial court's disobeying
precedent from another district because the Second District Court disagreed with the Third
District on the point of law (the validity of a no-knock search). Id. at 1131.
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each judge as a unit.72
The vertical stare decisis issue finally attracted the attention of the
supreme court when the Third District Court in Pardo certified an express
and direct conflict with Kopko on the issue of the admissibility of the child
victim's hearsay statements.73 The Pardo court further certified that it had
passed on a question of "great public importance., 74 The supreme court
accepted jurisdiction.75 Significantly, the supreme court found that in
addition to the substantive conflict about the admissibility of evidence, the
Third "[D]istrict [C]ourt's opinion conflicts with the Fourth District's
decision in State v. Hayes, and our decision in Weiman v. McHaffie" on the
stare decisis issue.76 Holding that "in the absence of interdistrict conflict,
district court decisions bind all Florida trial courts," Chief Justice Barkett
cited Weiman and quoted from Judge Walden's Fourth District opinion in
77
Hayes.
Thirty-six years after the establishment of the courts of appeal and
sixteen years after a conflict developed concerning the precedential value to
be accorded district court decisions by trial courts, the supreme court thus
resolved the conflict in favor of broadcast vertical stare decisis.7 ' The
Third District bowed to the supreme court's Pardo pronouncements a few
months later, when the Third District stated that the circuit "had no choice"
but to follow a Second District decision. 79 The Third District hastened to
add, however, that "this court is of course free to consider the issue as an
original question."8 The Third District happened to "completely agree
with . . . [the Second District decision, on the merits] and therefore . . .
[made] it a part of the law of. . . [the Third D]istrict."81 The balkanized
"law of the district" lives on.
Unanswered by the supreme court in Pardo, or otherwise in Florida

72. Cf Gregory S. Alexander, Takings and the Post-Modern Dialectic of Property, 9
CONST. COMMENTARY 2259 (1992) (contrasting the traditional view of property and takings
with the communitarian perspective, which emphasized the property owners' sense of
responsibility to the community for the use of their property as central to their realization of
individual freedom). The story one tells depends upon the normative theory that one applies.
73. Pardo, 582 So. 2d at 1228.
74. Id.
75. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(4).
76. Pardo, 596 So. 2d at 666 (citations omitted).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mazorra, 599 So. 2d 739, 739 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
80. Id. at 740 (emphasis added).
81. Id.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss2/20

14

Mattis and Mattis: Erie and Florida Law Conflict at the Crossroads: The Constitution
19941

Mattis / Mattis

1347

jurisprudence, is the question of what a trial judge should do where
decisions of two or more district courts other than her own conflict and the
trial judge's district is undecided on the issue. The likelihood of this
situation bothered the Venus Condominium court, which created the conflict
on the issue of vertical stare decisis in 1976.2 Justice Adkins also spoke
of the problem of placing a trial judge in "the dilemma of selecting one of
two conflicting district courts of appeals decisions as the proper case
law. 83
Three or four possible rules could be established for such situations:
(1) The trial court could follow the most recent appellate decision. In
effect, the most recent district court decision would overrule the earlier
district court decision in all undecided districts. In other words, assume that
the First District is first-in-time to decide a particular point of law. It
decides that the law is X. The law of X binds all trial courts in Florida.
Now the Second District Court decides that the law on that particular point
is Y. The law of X is overruled in the Second District, where Y now
becomes the law of the Second District. To the extent that trial courts
within the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Districts follow the last-in-time approach,
the law of X is also overruled in those districts by the Second District
decision for the law of Y.
(2) The trial court could follow the first-in-time decision. 4 A trial
court faced with the dilemma described could follow the law of X because
the first-in-time district court to decide the issue had so ruled. Thus, the
law of Y would bind only the Second District.
(3) The trial court could follow the decision that it considered the best
reasoned or that set the best policy, according to its own rights. Moreover,
it could choose and apply a rule different from that of either of the

82. Venus Condominium, 343 So. 2d at 1285. The court said that requiring a trial court
to follow other district courts "could lead to utter chaos were two of our sister courts to be
in conflict on a point of law raised in a trial court in this district," Id.
83. The Florida Bar Re: Rules of Appellate Procedure, 463 So. 2d 1114, 1124 (Fla.
1984) (Adkins, J.,
concurring).
84. AccordSowell v. Sowell, 92 S.E.2d 524, 526 (Ga. 1956). "Where there is conflict
existing in the decisions of this court, the correct rule must be determined from the earliest
decisions on the subject, and unless overruled, they are controlling." Id.; Richmond County
v. Sibert, 125 S.E.2d 129, 131 (Ga. Ct. App. 1962). "The Court of Appeals is bound by the
principles enunciated by the oldest Supreme Court decision, and not by the latest expression
of the Supreme Court which does not overrule, modify, or distinguish its oldest case." Id.
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conflicting districts.8 5
(4) If there are an odd number of such decisions the trial judge could
follow the majority.
Under any of the approaches "[t]he law is unsettled" 6 so long as both
vertical and horizontal stare decisis do not apply. The irony of vertical
without horizontal stare decisis is that a trial court may be reversed for
doing the "right" thing (following another district) or affirmed for doing the
"wrong" thing (rejecting precedent from another district). This anomaly is
less serious jurisprudentially than the balkanization problem. It is nonetheless troubling, and it does emphasize the logical relationship that ought to
exist between vertical and horizontal stare decisis.
It is true that Floridians and other persons need to know that the same
law will be applied in Pensacola, Tampa, and Miami, not only by trial
courts but also by courts of appeal. Most litigants will not get the
opportunity to have the Supreme Court of Florida directly apply any law to
their case. 7 It is also true that potential litigants within Pensacola, Tampa,
and Miami need to know that the same law will be applied whichever panel
of the district court reviews a trial court decision. Furthermore, potential
litigants need to know that the same law of Florida will be applied
regardless of whether they wind up in state or federal court. Before
examining the latter proposition, we shall consider the avoidance and
resolution of intradistrict conflicts among panels within each of the district
courts.
D. IntradistrictStare Decisis
Since the 1980 amendment of the Florida Constitution, the supreme

85. Accord State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Yapejian, 605 N.E.2d 539, 542 (I11.1992).
"This was not an instance in which the circuit court was faced with conflicting decisions from
the various appellate districts and, in the absence of controlling authority from its home
district, would have been free to choose between the decisions of the other appellate
districts." Id. (emphasis added). But cf Garcia v. Hynes & Howes Real Estate, Inc., 331
N.E.2d 634, 636 (111.App. Ct. 1975). "To apply the principle of optional selectivity by a
trial court in such situation could create an anomalous situation where the trial court one
week would follow one principle and the following week, a contrary principle." Id.
86. The Florida Bar Re: Rules of Appellate Procedure,463 So. 2d at 1124 (Adkins,
J., concurring).
87. See supra note 54.
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court has no jurisdiction to review intradistrict conflicts.8" An en banc
process providing for the district courts to resolve conflicts within their
respective districts is deemed an essential part of this appellate structural
scheme. 9 Patterning after en banc rules of the United States Courts of
Appeals for the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits,9" the Supreme Court of Florida
promulgated Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.331, effective in
1980.9' The rule authorizes each district court of appeal to sit en banc to
resolve intradistrict conflicts of decisions when "necessary to maintain
uniformity in the court's decisions." 92 In 1984, an additional provision for
en banc review was made for cases "of exceptional importance." 93
From its inception, the operation of the en banc rule has been troubled.94 In 1990, a district judge referred to it as "an old problem." 9 In
1982, the Florida Conference of District Court of Appeal Judges petitioned
the supreme court to consider an emergency rule change to address practical
88. In re Rule 9.331, Determination of Causes by a District Court of Appeal En Banc,
Florida Rules cof
Appellate Procedure, 416 So. 2d 1127, 1127 (Fla. 1982). Under article V,
section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution, the supreme court may review a district court
decision that expressly and directly conflicts with a decision of another district court. Under
section 3(b)(4), it may review a district court decision that is certified by it to be in direct
conflict with a decision of another district court. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(4).
89. In re Rule 9.331, Determination of Causes by a District Court of Appeal En Banc,
Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, 416 So. 2d at 1130 (Commentary).
90. Id.
91. FLA. ft. App. P. 9.33 1(a). This rule was originally promulgated in In re Rule 9.33 1,
Determination of Causes by a District Court of Appeal En Banc, Florida Rules of Appellate
Procedure, 374 So. 2d 992, 993 (Fla. 1979). Rule 9.33 1(a) has been amended several times,
most recently by In re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, 609 So. 2d
516, 564-65 (Fla. 1992). Most of the amendments are stylistic. However, in 1984, provision
for en banc review was made for cases "of exceptional importance" in addition to en banc
review when necessary to maintain uniformity in the court's decisions. The Florida Bar Re:
Rules of Appellate Procedure, 463 So. 2d at 1115.
92. FLA. R. App. P. 9.331(a).
93. The Florida Bar Re: Rules of Appellate Procedure, 463 So. 2d at 1119.
94. See generally Mattis, Stare Decisis Florida, supra note 23, at 163-72 (discussing the
history of intradistrict conflicts through various changes in the Florida Constitution). In State
v. Bankowski, the court "express[ed] [its] apologies" for "extreme delay in bringing [the]
matter to final disposition." 570 So. 2d 1152, 1153 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
95. State v. Georgoudiou, 560 So. 2d 1241, 1248 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.) (Cowart, J.,
dissenting), review denied, 574 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 1990). Judge Cowart cited numerous
opinions of district courts. Id. at 1248. He further referred to the "vague standard for
selection of cases for en banc consideration coupled with no appellate review of the selection
decision" which could "combine to deny the litigant equal protection of the law and deprive
him of his constitutional right to have his case on appeal heard and decided by the three
judge panel to which it was duly, and constitutionally, assigned for decision." Id.
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problems that had arisen in the en banc decisional process. The chiefjudges
of the district courts asked whether one three-judge panel could overrule or
recede from a prior decision of a three-judge panel of the same court. The
supreme court responded that it would not by court rule prohibit overruling
or receding by a three-judge panel, but it admonished the district judges to
refrain from that action. Instead, when a three-judge panel is confronted
with its district precedent with which it disagrees, it should suggest an en
banc hearing.96
Generally, the district courts seem to have refrained from panel
overruling, expressing a commitment to the proposition that a prior panel
decision of their particular district court is binding authority absent en banc
review.9 7 When a majority of district judges in a particular district think
it is necessary or desirable to recede from or overrule a prior decision, en
banc review is usually utilized.9 8 Despite the supreme court's admonition,
however, conflicting panel decisions do occur. 99 Inconsistent rulings by

96. In re Rule 9.331, Determinationof Causes by a District Court of Appeal En Banc,
Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure,416 So. 2d at 1128.
97. E.g., State v. Delasierra, 614 So. 2d 564, 566 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
(concurring opinion expressing "grave doubts about the constitutional validity?' of the
substantive rule (search and seizure) applied, but stating that "our recent decision . . . is
binding authority on this panel" and that Rule 9.331 "compels this result"); State v. Clark,
538 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (Schwartz, C.J., specially concurring)
(expressing continuing disagreement with a prior panel decision of which the court as awhole
denied en banc review, but stating that its holding represents "the law of this district," which
every subsequent panel is bound to follow under Rule 9.331); Holding Electric, Inc. v.
Roberts, 512 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (stating "[in the absence of a
decision by the court en banc to overrule Mardan, the present panel is bound by that
decision"), rev'd,530 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 1988): State v. Johnson, 516 So. 2d 1015, 1016 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (stating "[b]ecause we are bound by the prior decision of this court
we must affirm").
98. E.g., State v. McKenzie, 574 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (stating
"[because we find it necessary to recede from the holding [in a prior Fifth District decision],
we have considered this case en banc"); Brown v. Champeau, 537 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1989); Inscho v. State, 521 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1988); cf Fleischer
v. Hi-Rise Homes, Inc., 536 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (noting case removed
from en banc calendar since there was no conflict, no need to recede, and an absence of
exceptional importance) (Glickstein, J., dissenting).
99. In McBride v. State, 604 So. 2d 1291, 1292 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992), the Third
District Court chose to follow a 1991 Fourth District decision (Stayer) and reject a 1992
Fourth District decision (Scott). The Third District commented: "There appears to be no
authority for Scott's departure from the earlier panel decision in Stayer without the
intervention of an en banc court." Id. at 1292 n. I.
In Johnson v. State, 568 So. 2d 519 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1990), a three judge panel
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First District panels provided the supreme court with an opportunity to make
it clear that later panel decisions overrule prior panel decisions.'
In State
v. Walker,'' the supreme court accepted for review a 1991 Fourth District
decision on the basis that it conflicted with a 1986 First District decision. ' 2 The supreme court then ascertained that a 1990 First District
decision ruled opposite to a 1986 First District decision.0 3 The court held
that where there is an intradistrict conflict, a subsequent decision overrules
a prior decision as the decisional law in the district.'0 4 The subsequent
First District decision was consistent with the 1991 Fourth District decision.0 5 Therefore, no direct conflict was presented to the supreme court
as required by article V, section 3(b)(3), and the court dismissed the case
since it was without jurisdiction.'0 6
Another problem that has arisen under the en banc rule is a disagreement among district judges as to what constitutes intradistrict conflict
sufficient to authorize an en banc hearing or rehearing. The wording of
Rule 9.33 1(a) is hardly precise: "En banc hearings and rehearings shall not
be ordered unless the case is of exceptional importance or unless necessary
to maintain uniformity in the court's decisions."' Tests applied for what
is "necessary to maintain uniformity in the court's decisions" vary widely

of the First District ruled contrary to the earlier First District decision in Watson v. State, 504
So. 2d 1267, 1270 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1986), review denied, 506 So. 2d 1043 (Fla.
1987), on the issue of whether life felonies are subject to enhancement under the habitual
offender statute. The later decision did not mention the former.
In Ayares-Eisenberg Perrine Datsun, Inc. v. Sun Bank, 455 So. 2d 525, 528 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1984), the Third District Court followed a 1980 Third District decision and
did not follow a 1976 Third District decision, thus "find[ing] ourselves in conflict with
another panel of this court ...and with other district courts of appeal." The Sun Bank court
did not purport to overrule the contrary 1976 decision. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit then had to deal with the conflicts in attempting to apply the law of
Florida in a diversity case. Peoples Bank v. Roberts, 779 F.2d 1544 (1 Ith Cir. 1986).
100. See Johnson, 568 So. 2d at 519.
101. 593 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 1992).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1050. The court's citation of a 1968 supreme court case made it clear that
the rule had survived, or had been reinstated by various constitutional changes. It cited Little
v. State, 206 So. 2d 9, 10 (Fla. 1968), decided at a time when the supreme court had no
jurisdiction to review intradistrict conflict, as is once again the case since 1980. See Mattis,
Stare Decisis Florida, supra note 23, at 163, 166 n.144.
105. Walker, 593 So. 2d at 1049.
106. Id.
107. FLA. R. App. P.9.331(a) (emphasis added).
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among districts, panels, and judges. °8 In 1985, the supreme court answered a question certified to it by the Third District Court: What is the
proper scope of review for district courts of appeal in granting rehearings
en banc?0 9 The supreme court responded that district courts are free to
develop their own concepts of decisional uniformity."'
They are not
limited by the standards adopted by the supreme court in the exercise of its
discretionary conflict jurisdiction."' "[T]he district court of appeal, in
implementing the provisions of appellate procedure rule 9.33 1, has authority
to adopt the standard of conflict it believes necessary or appropriate in order
to harmonize the decisions of the court and avoid costly relitigation of
similar issues within its appellate district."' 12 Thus, standards in one
district may properly be different from standards in another, without creating
a conflict between district court decisions to activate supreme court conflict
jurisdiction.'
Not surprisingly, disagreement and uneven application of standards
persist among the district judges." 4 The district judges use a variety of
tests, such as: (1) whether it would be difficult for the legal profession to
harmonize the original panel decision under review with a prior decision of
the same district;" 5 (2) whether the decisions are so inconsistent and
disharmonious that they would not have been rendered by the same panel
108. See Harvey J. Sepler, En Banc Review in FloridaAppellate Courts, 62 FLA. B.J.
37, 38-39 nn.1 1-13 (1988) (citing adozen cases representing all districts utilizing what Sepler
analyzes as three parallel tests for decisional uniformity in the en banc context). Moreover,
there is no clear agreement on a test for "exceptional importance." State v. Georgoudiou,
560 So. 2d 1241, 1247 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (en banc) (Cowart, J., dissenting).
109. Chase Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Schreiber, 479 So. 2d 90, 91 (Fla. 1985), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1160 (1986).
110. Id.
111.Id.
112. Id. at 94.
113. See Schreiber,479 So. 2d at 104-05 (Ehrlich, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
114. See Mattis, StareDecisis Florida,supra note 23, at 172; Georgoudiou, 560 So. 2d
at 1241; Fleischer v. Hi-Rise Homes, Inc., 536 So. 2d 1101, 1102 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1988) (referring to "protracted debate, for which we [the court] must confessjudicial dismay"
in deciding to reconsider and not to render an en banc decision); State v. Navarro, 464 So.
2d 137, 140 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (granting rehearing en banc on basis of
"misapplication of a rule of law," citing the supreme court's decision in Schreiber, opinion
filed July 26, 1984) (Ferguson, J., dissenting to rehearing en banc); see also Sepler, supra
note 108, at 37-39.
115. Schreiber, 422 So. 2d at 912-13, quashed on othergrounds, 479 So. 2d 90 (Fla.
1985). Judge Schwartz's "practical" test was approved by the supreme court in quashing
Schreiber, 479 So. 2d at 94-95.
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of the court;" 6 (3) whether there has been a misapplication of a wellestablished rule of law of the district;".7 (4) whether the appellate court
directly recedes from its own previously announced rule of law; and, (5)
whether the court applied the same rule in two cases having indistinguishable facts, but nevertheless reached two different conclusions." 8
We are left, then, with different rules among district judges within a
district, among panels, and among the five district courts of appeal regarding
when en banc review is necessary to achieve uniformity of law within a
district. Even more troubling, each district is free to create conflicts with
other districts on substantive points of law and each district has done so
freely and without qualm. The question then becomes, as long as we do not
recognize horizontal stare decisis, do we have "the law of Florida" on any
particular point or do we indeed have the laws of five balkanized districts?
The answer depends only partially on how dependably and how expeditiously the supreme court resolves conflicts among the districts. The answer has
an impact on even-handedness of treatment among Florida state litigants, the
equality of treatment between state court and federal court litigants, and the
constitutional underpinnings of Erie.

1II. THE ERIE OVERLAY: FEDERAL COURTS'
TREATMENT OF STATE LAW

Our system of jurisprudence comprises a dual court system containing
both state and federal courts. Often, a state court is required to apply
federal law. Similarly, a federal court is often called upon to apply state
law to a specific issue in a particular case." 9 However, if there is no
statute or recent decision by the state's highest court, the federal court faces
the problem of determining the content of the rule of state law that is to be
applied.

116. Also a "practical" test enunciated by Judge Schwartz in Schreiber, 422 So. 2d at
912 n.I.
117. Navarro, 464 So. 2d at 140. Judge Ferguson, in his dissenting opinion, labeled the
standard freewheeling and elusive. Id. at 143.
118. Extensive case citation for all of these tests is provided in Sepler, supra note 108,
at 37-39.
119. The problem arises in diversity cases as well as federal question cases whenever
the federal law Fails to supply a rule of decision, but refers to state law for an answer. See,
e.g., Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967); see also supra notes 3-8 and
accompanying text.
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A. Early Erie
In the 1938 case of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,120 the Supreme
Court of the United States handed down what has been characterized as one
of the most important cases in American legal history.'
In that case,
Justice Brandeis indicated that when state law supplied the rule of decision,
the federal court was to apply state law whether "declared by its Legislature
in a statute or by its highest court."' 2 In 1940, the Supreme Court handed
down a series of decisions dealing with the problem of how to determine the
content of state law when state law supplied the rule of decision on an
issue."2 3 The Court held that a federal court must follow the decision of
a lower state court in the absence of any persuasive data that the highest
124
court of the state would decide otherwise.
The most troublesome of the 1940 cases was Fidelity Union Trust Co.
v. Field,2 which involved the decisions of a New Jersey trial court of
statewide jurisdiction. 126 The New Jersey Legislature had passed a statute
that clearly seemed to change prior law and permit a legal device known as
a "totten trust."' 2 7 However, in two separate cases that came before the
New Jersey Court of Chancery, 21 two vice-chancellors held that the
statute had not changed the law and that "totten trusts" were not permitted
in spite of the statute.'29
When a similar case came before a federal court in New Jersey, the
Third Circuit recognized that under the command of Erie, it was required
to apply state law with regard to the construction of state statutes.' 30 The

120. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
121. See CHARLES A. WRIGHT,

FEDERAL COURTS 352-53 (4th ed. 1983). Professor
Wright says: "It is impossible to overstate the importance of the Erie decision. It ... goes
to the heart of the relations between the federal government and the states, and returns to the
states a power that had for nearly a century been exercised by the federal government." Id.
at 355.
122. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (1938).
123.

WRIGHT, supra note 121, at 372.

124. Id. at 370-71.
125. 311 U.S. 169 (1940), rev'g 108 F.2d 521 (3d Cir. 1939).
126. Id.
127. WRIGHT, supra note 121, at 370. A "totten trust" allows parties to deposit funds
in a bank and name themselves trustee for another, thereby creating atentative trust revocable
at any time before death. Id.
128. A nisiprius (or trial) court.
129. WRIGHT, supra note 121, at 371.
130. Field v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., 108 F.2d 521, 526 (3d Cir. 1939), rev'don other
grounds, 311 U.S. 169 (1940).
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question remained, however, whose interpretation of the statute the court
should use. Reading the Erie reference to the "highest court" literally, two
judges of the Third Circuit panel concluded that they were not bound to
follow a New Jersey trial court's interpretation of the statute. 131 They
stated that "[w]here that law has been determined by the courts of last resort
their decisions are stare decisis, and must be followed . . . . As to the
pronouncements of other state courts, however, we are not so bound, but
may conclude that the decision does not truly express the state law."' 32
vice-chancellors, and
The court refused to follow the decisions of the 133
awarded the proceeds of the trust to the beneficiary.
The Supreme Court reversed and held that where the state law supplies
the rule of decision, it is the duty of the federal courts "to ascertain and
apply that law even though it has not been expounded by the highest court
of the State."' 3 n Subsequently, when the "totten trust" issue came before
a New Jersey state court, the decision of the Third Circuit was followed,
with the notation that it had been "reversed on other grounds" by the
Supreme Court.' 35 Thus, on the question of the content of New Jersey
law, it turned out that the Third Circuit had been correct.
This was grist for the mill of legal scholarship, and leading scholars of
the day criticized the Supreme Court's Field doctrine from the academy' 36
and the bench. In a brief but biting criticism, Judge Jerome N. Frank
likened federal judges, faced with questions of state law, as being forced by
the Supreme Court "to play the rule [sic, role] of ventriloquist's dummy to
the courts of some particular state.' 37 Years later, the late Judge Henry
Friendly, one of the leading legal scholars of our century, referred to the
Supreme Court's 1940 series of decisions as "the excesses of 311 U.S. [of
the United States Reports].' 38

131. Id. at 527
132. Id. at 526.
133. Id.
134. Field, 311 U.S. at 177.
135. Hickey v. Kahl, 19 A.2d 33 (1941).
136. See Charles E. Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 290-95 (1946). Charles Clark, a former Dean
of the Yale Law School, was United States Circuit Judge, Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
when he wrote this article. Id.; see also Arthur L. Corbin, The Laws of the Several States,
50 YALE L.J. 762 (194 1); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law,
54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 510 (1954).
137. Richardson v. Commissioner, 126 F.2d 562, 567 (2d Cir. 1942).
138. Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common. Law, 39
N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 400 (1964).
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The zenith of the Field doctrine probably came in a Sixth Circuit case.
The Sixth Circuit felt bound to follow an unreported decision of an
intermediate Ohio court in the face of an Ohio statute providing that "only
such cases as are hereafter reported in accordance with the provisions of this
section shall be recognized by and receive the official sanction of any court
' 139
within the state.
B. Reformed Erie
It seemed inevitable that the Supreme Court would have to back down
from the furthest extremes of the Field doctrine. As Professor Wright has
pointed out, to do otherwise would be to simply substitute one kind of
forum shopping for another. He writes:
The lawyer whose case was dependent on an old or shaky state court
decision that might no longer be followed within the state would have
a strong incentive to maneuver the case into federal court, where, on the
mechanical jurisprudence that the Erie doctrine was once thought to
require [under Field], the state decision could not have been impeached.140
By 1967, the Second Circuit decided that it was no longer bound by the
Field holding. 4' Despite the fact that Field had not been expressly
overruled, subsequent Supreme Court decisions indicated that it had been
modified.'
In its strictest sense, Field was no longer the law.' 43 Presently, the position expressed by the Second Circuit is well accepted among
the federal appellate courts. 144
However, since the Field case, the Supreme Court has given very few
instructions to the bench and bar on solving the problem of how a federal
court is to determine state law when the question has not been addressed by
the highest state court. Moreover, except for expressing a general approval
of the certification process, whereby federal courts can certify questions of
139. Gustin v. Sun Life Assur. Co., 154 F.2d 961 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 866
(1946).
140. WRIGHT, supra note 121, at 374.
141. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967). In Roginsky,
the court stated: "[wie do not consider ourselves as bound by the rulings of a state nisiprius
judge although we treat these with respect." Id. at 851.
142. WRIGHT, supra note 121, at 372.
143. Id.
144. 19 CHARLEs A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4507 at
88-91 (1988) [hereinafter PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE].
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state law to the highest state court, 45 the Court has never touched on the
problem of conflicting decisions among state appellate courts.
The first retreat from the furthest extensions of the Fielddoctrine came
in 1948.146 In King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers,147 the
Court was faced with the contention that a federal court was bound by an
unreported decision of a South Carolina Court of Common Pleas that would
not have had precedential value in any other South Carolina court. 48 The
Court indicated that such a case was entitled to "some weight."'' 49 However, the Court decided it was not controlling on the federal court. 5 '
Less than a decade later, the Court gave further instructions on this
issue. Where the highest state court had spoken, time or other events might
cast doubt on whether the previous decision would still be followed. The
issue in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America"' was whether a 1910
Vermont decision was binding on a federal court in 1956.152 The Court
held that it was, but at the same time instructed lower courts, in a roundabout way, on how they should handle such a problem.' 53 The Court
stated: "[T]here appears to be no confusion in the Vermont decisions, no
developing line of authorities that casts a shadow over the established ones,
no dicta, doubts or ambiguities in the opinions of the Vermont judges on the
question, no legislative development that promises to undermine the judicial
rule."' 5 4 The Court seemed to be asking the lower courts to draw the
inference that if there had been any doubts, a federal court might have been
free to disregard a holding by a state trial court, or even the 1910 decision
by the state's highest court.
Further instruction on how to handle the problems of state law content
was present in the 1967 federal tax case of Commissioner v. Estate of
Bosch,' 55 involving a situation where the federal court was required to

145.
363 U.S.
ing text.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

E.g., Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd.,
207 (1960). Certification is discussed infra notes 241-42, 255-58 and accompany-

WRIGHT, supra note 121, at 372.
333 U.S. 153 (1948).
WRIGHT, supra note 121, at 372.
King, 333 U.S. at 160.
Id. at 161.
350 US. 198 (1956).
Id. at 202.
Id. at 204-05.
154. Id. at 205. The implications of Bernhardt are discussed in 19 PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, supra note 144, at 87-91.
155. 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
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apply state law in solving a federal tax question.' 56 In Bosch, the Court
cited Erie cases and said that "under some conditions, federal authority may
not be bound even by an intermediate state appellate court ruling. 15 7
The Bosch Court held:
[W]hen the application of a federal statute is involved, the decision of
a state trial court ... should afortiori not be controlling . . . . This is
not a diversity case but the same principle may be applied for the same
reasons, viz., the underlying substantive rule involved is based on state
law and the State's highest court is the best authority on its own law.
If there be no decision by that court then federal authorities must apply
what they find to be the state law after giving "proper regard" to
relevant rulings of other courts of the State. In this respect, it may be
said to be, in effect, sitting as a state court

58

The court's holding was a far cry from the implications of the 1940
Field decision. In fact, for the last several decades, federal courts have
indicated that they are no longer absolutely bound by decisions of lower
state courts. 59 Some federal courts have even felt free, under the updated
version of Erie, to refuse to follow outdated decisions of the highest court
of the state when applying the law of that state.16
Two of the dissenters in Bosch developed the formula now being
applied "to determine state law in diversity cases-essentially, that, absent
a recent judgment of the State's highest court, state cases are only data from
which the law must be derived-is necessarily applicable without modifica'
tion in all situations in which federal courts must ascertain state law."161
Having stated what they thought to be the majority's rule, Justices Harlan
and Fortas, disagreed with it.' 62 According to them, "[t]he relationship
between the state and federal judicial systems is simply too delicate and
important to be reduced to any single standard."' 6 3
Perhaps the standard announced by Justices Harlan and Fortas, with

156. Id. at 465.
157. Id.
158. Id. (emphasis added).
159. See 19 PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 144, at 88-98.
160. Mason v. American Emery Wheel Works, 241 F.2d 906 (1st Cir. 1957) (refusing
to be bound by an outdated holding of the Mississippi Supreme Court in light of recent
statements by that court indicating that it might no longer follow the old rule).
161. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. at 477 (Harlan, J., and Fortas, J., dissenting).
162. Id.
163. Id.
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regard to their understanding of how the formula should be applied, is itself
a bit too simplistic. According to Professors Wright, Miller and Cooper, a
"solid statement"' 64 of the method to be applied by federal judges, faced
with problems of interpreting state law, was the one announced by the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals in McKenna v. Ortho PharmaceuticalCorp.'65
As stated by the court in McKenna:
An accurate forecast of [state] law, as it would be expressed by its
highest court, requires an examination of all relevant sources of that
state's law in order to isolate those factors that would inform its
decision. The primary source that must be analyzed of course, is the
decisional law of the [state supreme court]. In the absence of authority
directly on point, decisions by that court in analogous cases provide
useful indications of the court's probable disposition of a particular
question of law. It is important to note, however, that our prediction
"cannot be the product of a mere recitation of previously decided
cases." In determining state law, a federal tribunal should be careful to
avoid the "danger" of giving "a state court decision a more binding
effect than would a court of that state under similar circumstances."
Rather, relevant state precedents must be scrutinized with an eye toward
the broad policies that informed those adjudications, and to the doctrinal
trends which they evince.
Considered dicta by the state's highest court may also provide a
federal court with reliable indicia of how the state tribunal might rule
on a particular question. Because the highest state court "enjoys some
latitude of decision in ascertaining the law applicable to a particular
dispute even where there may be dicta in point," however, a federal
court should be circumspect in surrendering its own judgment concerning what the state law is on account of dicta. As Professor Charles Alan
Wright has written, "much depends on the character of the dictum." Of
somewhat less importance to a prognostication of what the highest state
court will do are decisions of lower state courts and other federal courts.
Such decisions should be accorded "proper regard" of course, but not
conclusive effect. Thus, the Supreme Court has held that although the
decision of a lower state court "should be 'attributed some weight ...
the decision (is) not controlling . . . ' where the highest court of the
State has not spoken on the point ....Thus, under some conditions,
federal authority may not be bound even by an intermediate state
appellate court ruling." Additionally, federal courts may consider
scholarly treatises, the Restatement of Law, and germane law review

164. 19 PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 144, at 89 n.30.
165. 622 F.2d 657 (3d Cir. 1980).
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articles-particularly, it seems, of schools within the state whose law is
to be predicted.'66
Note, however, that even with this elaborate statement, nothing is said about
the problem of conflicting state intermediate appellate court decisions.
C. Erie Instructions-Fewand Far Between
There have only been three instances since 1940 where the Supreme
Court of the United States has addressed the problem of how a federal court
is to determine the content of state law when state law provides the rule of
decision. 167 King, Bernhardt, and Bosch are the only guidelines handed
down by the Court since Field. The most recent of those three cases is now
more than a quarter century old.
At the time Erie was decided, only twelve of the then forty-eight states
had intermediate appellate courts. 61 Moreover, the entire corpus juris of
the country was far less complex than it is today. Presently, there has yet
to be a Supreme Court decision instructing the lower federal courts on how
to handle the problems of conflicting state intermediate appellate court
decisions.
Although it is true that there have been Supreme Court cases emphasizing the "twin aims of the Erie doctrine-'discouragement of forum-shopping
and avoidance of inequitable administration of the [laws],"". 16 9 these cases,

had nothing to do with the problem of ascertainment of state law. It seems
obvious that if the twin aims of the Erie doctrine are discouragement of
forum shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the law, 7 °
then the problem of conflicting state appellate court decisions is a problem
that should be addressed. As long as the law administered in the federal
courthouse is different from the law administered in the state courthouse
down the street, there will be forum shopping, and it will therefore be

166. Id.at 662-63 (footnotes omitted).
167. King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of Am., 333 U.S. 153 (1948);
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., Inc., 350 U.S. 198 (1956); Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S.
at 456.
168. This number came from a count of the courts listed in the front of the West
National Reporter system in 1938. Of these 12, some had only limited jurisdiction, such as
the Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals.
169. Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 234 (1991) (quoting Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965), on the twin aims of Erie).
170. Aren't these "twin aims" really one and the same?

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss2/20

28

Mattis and Mattis: Erie and Florida Law Conflict at the Crossroads: The Constitution

1994]

Matts / Mattis

1361

impossible to avoid inequitable administration of the law.' 7'
If the highest court of the state whose substantive law is applicable has
addressed the issue in a fairly recent case, the problem of what law federal
courts should apply is almost nonexistent. The federal court simply applies
the law as enunciated by the highest state court. 172 If the highest court has
spoken to the issue, but time or developments in other jurisdictions have
created a doubt as to whether the previous decision would be followed
today, the Supreme Court
has given instructions on how a federal court is
73
to handle the problem.
A more serious problem of applying state law occurs when there is no
decision by the highest court of the state, but there are decisions by lower
courts at either the trial or appellate level. This issue is complicated by the
Supreme Court's modification of its original position without expressly
overruling Field. However, as discussed above, it now seems clear that a
federal court is no longer absolutely bound by a decision of a lower state
court at either the trial or appellate level. 174 The only requirement is that
federal courts. give them "proper regard.' 7 5 Beyond this rather meager
guidance, however, very little is clear.
Perhaps the thorniest problem for the federal trial judge in this area is
the situation that exists when there are conflicting decisions among state
intermediate appellate courts. Most federal courts will handle this problem
by deciding the issue the way they think the highest court in the state would
decide it. Those who follow this policy seem to perceive it as the policy of
the Supreme Court as well. However, this method may well encourage
forum shopping.
Since several states that have distinct and different systems of appellate
courts, it seems improbable that the twin aims of Erie can be met if all state
court systems are treated the same way by federal courts deciding issues of
state law. Recall the statement of Justices Harlan and Fortas, dissenting in
Bosch: "The relationship between the state and federal judicial system is
simply too delicate and important to be reduced to any single standard."' 76

171. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945). "The nub of the policy that
underlies Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins is that for the same transaction the accident of a suit by
a non-resident litigant in a federal court instead of in a State court a block away should not
lead to a substantially different result." Id.
172. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. at 465.
173. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 205 (1956).
174. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. at 457.
175. Id. at 465.
176. Id. at 477.
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D. The Klaxon Overlay
After Harry Tompkins was struck by an object protruding from a train
while walking in Pennsylvania on a right-of-way belonging to the Erie
Railroad, he brought suit against the railroad in New York.'77 The
Supreme Court held that the standard of duty owed by the railroad to
Tompkins was determined by state law rather than general federal common
law. "78
' It was unclear which state's law the court should use in making
its decision: New York's, where the trial was held, or Pennsylvania's, where
the accident occurred. Everyone who read the opinion must have known
that the Court was referring to the law of Pennsylvania, but the Court was
not explicit about the method of choosing the rule of state law in a conflict
of laws situation. The oversight was corrected three years later, in Klaxon
Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co.,'79 when the Court set down the

rule that:
The conflict of laws rules to be applied by the federal court in Delaware
must conform to those prevailing in Delaware's state courts. Otherwise,
the accident of diversity of citizenship would constantly disturb equal
administration of justice in coordinate state and federal courts sitting
side by side ....

And the proper function of the Delaware federal
court
80

is to ascertain what the state law is, not what it ought to be.

In other words, a federal court, sitting in a particular state, should give
the same deference to that state's choice of law (or conflict of law) rules as
it would be required to give to the state's substantive law rules.' 8 ' Thus,
a New York federal judge, faced with a conflicts problem from an accident
that occurred in California, is to apply the same law that the New York
Court of Appeals would apply in solving the problem. If it is more likely
that the New York Court of Appeals would apply California substantive law,
then so must the federal judge sitting in New York. This situation led Judge
Friendly to posit:
Our principal task, in this diversity of citizenship case, is to deter-

177. For a fascinating account of the story of the litigation in Erie, see Irving Younger,
What Happened in Erie, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1011 (1978).
178. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.

179. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
180. Id at 496. This rule was reaffirmed by the Court in Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v.
Challoner, 423 U.S. 3 (1975).
181. Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496.
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mine what the New York courts would think the California courts

would think on an issue about which neither has thought. They have
had no occasion to do so. But life, here coupled with death, casts up

new problems, and the court seised of the case is obliged, as best it can,
itself to blaze the trail of the foreign law that it has been directed to
follow. 8 ,

Facetious as this statement was, there is little doubt that it is as accurate
today as when it was first written.
Given that federal courts are under the command of Erie-with its twin
goals, preventing forum shopping and inequitable administration of the
law-and given the Klaxon overlay, should federal courts faced with a state
law problem simply decide the case the way they think the state's highest
court would decide it; or should they try to foster the twin goals of Erie and
decide the issue according to the decisions that would be binding on a state
trial judge?
E. A Changed Situation With State Intermediate Courts
As mentioned above, when Erie was decided only twelve states had
intermediate appellate courts.183 Today, there are thirty-seven states with
intermediate appellate courts.' 84 Many of these have been created in the
past twenty years.' 85 It seems safe to say that today, most of the new
"law" that binds state trial courts is handed down by state intermediate
appellate courts, rather than by the highest courts of the several states. And
yet, judges and legal scholars have paid little attention to the problems
raised by the question of which courts are "bound" by intermediate appellate
court decisions. This is true at both the state and the federal level.
Even in those states where it is agreed that an intermediate appellate
court decision is binding on all state trial courts, there has yet to be much
discussion about the problems raised by conflicting decisions among the
intermediate appellate courts. There can be conflicting decisions between
districts (interdistrict conflict); as well as conflicting decisions within the
same appellate district (intradistrict conflict).

182. Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 276 F.2d 280, 281 (2d Cir. 1960).
183. ROBERT L. STERN, APPELLATE PRAcTICE INTHE UNITED STATES 6 (2d ed. 1988).
184. Id.
185. Id. At the time Mr. Stem wrote this book, there were 38 states with intermediate
appellate courts because North Dakota had created a "temporary court of appeals" for the
period from July 1, 1987, through January 1, 1990. Id. at 7 n.14.
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As discussed above, 8 6 until the Supreme Court of Florida rejected the
rule, some appellate districts in Florida were holding that the courts below
them were not bound by a decision of Florida appellate courts in other
districts. In many states with intermediate appellate courts, the highest court
has never spoken on the question. One appellate court may say that any
appellate decision is binding on all trial courts in the state, but if another
appellate court in the same state lays down a different rule, who is to say
what the law of the state is on that point? When there is a conflict between
the First and Fifth Districts, what are the trial judges in the Second, Third,
and Fourth Districts supposed to do?'87 Few authoritative answers exist.
As we have seen in the Florida cases, courts even disagree on the
question of whether there is a conflict between appellate decisions.' 88 Just
as one person's freedom fighter may be another person's terrorist, one
judge's conflict may seem like perfect harmony to another judge.
In his classic book, Professor Levi described legal reasoning, or stare
decisis, as
a three-step process described by the doctrine of precedent in which a
proposition descriptive of the first case is made into a rule of law and
then applied to a next similar situation. The steps are these: similarity
is seen between the cases; next the rule of law inherent in the first case
is announced; then the rule of law is made applicable to the second case
. .. . The determination of similarity or difference is the function of

eachjudge. Where case law is considered, and there is no statute, he
is not bound by the statement of the rule of law made by the prior
judge even in the controlling case. The statement is mere dictum, and
this means that the judge in the present case may find irrelevant the
existence or absence of facts which prior judges thought important. 89

186. See supra notes 37-81 and accompanying text.
187. Some of the possibilities are discussed supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 108-18 and accompanying text.
189. EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING i-2 (1949) (emphasis
added). Professor Levi later became Dean of the University of Chicago Law School and
Attorney General of the United States.
Of course not everyone will agree with Professor Levi. He cites Professor Goodhart
as presenting a different view. See Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case,
40 YALE L. J. 161 (1930); see also BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS (1921); JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL (1969); KARL LLEWELYN, THE
COMMON LAW TRADITION:

DECIDING APPEALS (1960); E. PATTERSON, JURISPRUDENCE

(1953).
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Under such a system, it is only natural that there may be disagreement
among lawyers and judges as to when a conflict between appellate decisions
exists. Certainly, most would agree that there will indeed be conflicts. That
being the case, it would seem that there should be rules, binding on all
courts within a system, instructing them on what to do in case a conflict
between decisions of appellate courts on the same level arises.
Several states have rules of precedent where it is agreed that an
intermediate appellate court is not bound by the decision of a sister
court.' 90 Other jurisdictions, however, have rules that require an intermediate appellate court either to adhere to previous decisions by a court or
panel on the same level, or to follow a special procedure for overruling the
case.' 9 ' It seems probable that in several states the problem has never
been addressed by either the appellate courts or the highest state court.
With all of these different court systems and rules of appellate
precedent existing among the states, federal courts have had very little
guidance from the Supreme Court on how the problem of lower court
precedent should be handled. What has been created in many states is a
forum shopper's supermarket. Because of the prevailing rules of precedent
binding on federal trial courts in Florida,'92 there will be frequent situations where a litigant, by filing in or removing to a federal court, will get
a different result on an issue of state law from that which would have
resulted had he filed in the state court down the street.
F. Judicial Debate in Chicago
The question of how a federal court should handle the problem of
ascertaining the content of state law, when there are conflicting decisions
among panels of the state's intermediate appellate courts, sparked a
remarkable debate by judicial opinion between two judges of the United

190. See, e.g., Taylor Mattis & Kenneth Yalowitz, Stare Decisis Among [sic] the
Appellate Court of Illinois, 28 DEPAUL L. REV. 571, 583-592 (1979) (discussing the Illinois
rule); McGlothlen v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 140 Cal. Rptr. 168 (1977).
19 1. See Taylor Mattis, Stare Decisis Within Michigan's Court ofAppeals: Precedential
Effect of Its Decisionson the Court Itself and on Michigan Trial Courts, 37 WAYNE L. REV.
265 (1991) [hereinafter Mattis, Stare Decisis Michigan] (discussing the Michigan
Administrative Order 1990-6). Among the federal courts of appeal, the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits have rules under which a prior decision of the circuit (panel or en banc) cannot be
overruled by a panel, but only by the court sitting en banc. See Atlantis Dev. Corp., Ltd. v.
United States, 379 F.2d 818, 828 (5th Cir. 1967); Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206,
1209 (11 th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
192. See infra notes 232-51 and accompanying text.
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States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.' 93 This debate
merits extensive consideration in light of participants' intuitive insights into
the general problem of Erie and state intermediate court decisions. It also
merits detailed examination for its application to Florida as well as Illinois.
The debate stage was set by a question of substantive state law: whether an
insured may, under Illinois common law, maintain a claim against an insurer
for its bad faith conduct in handling a first party claim under an insurance
policy, and if so, whether punitive damages are available.
Like the five district courts of appeal in Florida, Illinois also has five
district courts of appeal, although the latter system is unitary.194 A panel

193. The Erie doctrine presents such complex legal problems that when we see judges
examining it, we cannot help but think of the tale of the five blind men and the elephant.
Each blind man was asked to feel part of the elephant, and was then asked to describe it.
Each of the blind men touched the elephant and described it variously as a tree trunk, a
serpent, a hose, a fan, and a wall.
If a judge sees the Erie case as a constitutional command, then the judge may act
differently from the judge who sees it as merely a prudential judicial policy. Professor
Wright points out that the early commentators had a great deal to say about the constitutional
discussion in Erie, most of it critical. However, in recent years there has been substantial
scholarly support for the constitutional aspect of the case. WRIGHT, supra note 121, at 363.
Articles, pro and con, by many very distinguished scholars are listed. Id. nn. 14-16; see also
John H. Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693 (1974) [hereinafter Ely,
Myth of Erie].
We like to tempt our federal court students into further understanding by reading to
them Professor Abram Chayes' comment about Professor Ely's article:
Professor Ely's full dress encounter with Erie is in every way the work of an
adept. With his overall analytic framework I have no quarrel. On the contrary,
I think his approach clarifies much that has mystified several decades of civil
procedure students-which probably means that their professors have been
mystified as well.
Abram Chayes, The Bead Game, 87 HARV. L. REV. 741, 741 (1974); see also John H. Ely,
The Necklace, 87 HARV. L. REV. 753 (1974); Paul J, Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on
Erie-The Thread, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1682 (1974).
Professor Ely suggests that Erie is not "a monolithic doctrine," but rather "three distinct
and rather ordinary problems of statutory and constitutional interpretation." Ely, Myth of
Erie, supra at 698. He contends that the Supreme Court practice of allowing federal courts
to substitute general federal common law for state common law, as was done for almost a
century under Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. I (1842), "was unconstitutional because nothing in the
Constitution provided the central government with a general lawmaking authority of the sort
the Court had been exercising under Swift." Id. at 703.
194. See infra note 289. The population of Illinois is roughly the same as that of
Florida but is distributed much less evenly than Florida's. The Chicago/Cook County area
has by far the heaviest concentration of people. Of the five appellate districts, the one
encompassing Cook County has the most judges, and consequently the best chance for an
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of the Fifth District Appellate Court of Illinois had held that there was a
common law cause of action in tort for an insurer's bad faith refusal to
make payments under a first party policy, adding that punitive damages
were available under proper circumstances.' 95 The First and Third
Districts had held that a common law claim would not be allowed because
it had been preempted by a statute. 196 The Fourth District has held that
an earlier version of the statute had not preempted the field, and declined to
express an opinion as to the newer version of the statute.' 97 The Second
District has held that the statute bars a common law claim for punitive
damages, but leaves open the possibility of a common law recovery in tort
for compensatory damages. 9 ' Thus, within a fairly short time span,
Illinois district courts of appeal have taken several distinct approaches
regarding the interpretation of the same state statute. Review had been
sought and denied by the Supreme Court of Illinois in most of these cases.
This same substantive law problem was brought before Milton I.
Shadur and Prentice H. Marshall, judges for the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois.' 99 These two judges followed different approaches in determining the process to be used by a federal judge in
determining the content of state substantive law to be applied.
Judge Shadur had held, in previous cases involving other points of law,
that Erie requires a federal court to decide issues of substantive law in the

intradistrict conflict.
195. Ledingham v. Blue Cross Plan for Hosp. Care of Hosp. Serv. Corp., 330 N.E.2d
540 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975), revd on other grounds, 356 N.E.2d 75 (11. 1976). There was no
indication that the court considered the effect of the statute on the plaintiffs right to assert
a common law claim. Subsequent to this decision, the statute was amended.
196. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, § 767 (1983); see also Tobolt v. Allstate Ins. Co., 393
N.E.2d 1171, 1180 (II. App. Ct. 1979); Debolt v. Mutual of Omaha, 371 N.E.2d 373, 376-77
(111.App. Ct. 1978). Tobolt appears to have been based on the pre-1977 version of the
statute, but the court indicated that the present version of the statute supported its conclusion
as well. Tobolt, 393 N.E.2d at 1180.
197. Lynch v. Mid-America Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 418 N.E.2d 421, 425 (III. App. Ct.
1981). The Fourth District has held that the statute was not applicable when the insurer is
a nonprofit health care service corporation. McCall v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 452 N.E.2d
893, 896 (III. App. Ct. 1983).
198. Hoffman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 407 N.E.2d 156, 158-59 (111.App. Ct. 1980).
199. The substantive issue was brought before several of the judges of the United States
District Courts in Illinois. For the most part, we will confine our discussion to the way the
problem was handled by two of them.
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same way as a state trial judge would sitting in the same location.2"'
Because he was sitting in Cook County, Illinois, Judge Shadur believed he
should decide substantive law questions as if he were sitting as the Circuit
Court of Cook County (the state trial court). As such, he would be required
by Illinois law to follow the decisions of the First District of the Illinois
Appellate Court.
Judge Marshall took the position that he was required to decide any
issue of Illinois law the way he believed it would be decided by the Illinois
Supreme Court.2"' On the issue before him, he did not think the Illinois
Supreme Court would follow the decision of the First District.2 2
1. The Marshall Position-Supreme Court Swami 0 3
Judge Marshall, when faced with the complex problem of conflicting
intermediate appellate court decisions, resorts to what he labels the
"Supreme Court predictive approach."20 4 He admits that this approach
does not have the advantage of being a bright line rule, and that judges will
inevitably be "gazing into a crystal ball" '2 5 on some occasions. He states:
The proposition that we must act as state trial judges stems from a
misapprehension of the commands of Erie and its progeny. Erie
requires a federal court to apply the substantive law of the forum state;

200. See, e.g., Slate Printing Co. v. Metro Envelope Co., 532 F. Supp. 431, 434 (N.D.
Ill. 1982) (Shadur, J.); National Can Corp. v. Whittaker Corp., 505 F. Supp. 147, 148-9 n.2
(N.D. Ill. 1981) (Shadur, J.).
201. Roberts v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 568 F. Supp. 536, 539-40 (N.D. 111.
1983); Kelly v. Stratton, 552 F. Supp. 641, 645 (N.D. II1. 1982).
202. Roberts, 568 F. Supp. at 554-55. We need not be concerned here as to the reasons
why Judge Marshall believed that the First District was wrong on the issue. Suffice it to say
that he believed he had sufficient grounds to believe that the Illinois Supreme Court would
use a different method in solving the problem of statutory interpretation that was before the
court.
Ironically, anotherjudge in the same district agreed with Judge Marshall on the method
to be followed, (deciding the way he thought the Illinois Supreme Court would decide).
However, that judge agreed with Judge Shadur on the merits of the issue, i.e. reached the
same result as the First District.
203. Judge Marshall's opinions are long and quite detailed. He cites many primary and
secondary authorities to support his position. It is impractical to reproduce those opinions
in full here. At the same time there is a danger that the authors, by paraphrasing, may have
missed important points made by the judge. For those who are interested in further detail,
we suggest an examination of the original opinions discussed here.
204. Roberts, 568 F. Supp. at 543.
205. Id. at 545.
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we take this to mean that we must apply the law that ultimately would
be applied were the case to be litigated in the state courts. While
intermediate appellate decisions exert upon us a high degree of
persuasive force, and while they may be binding upon state trial courts,
the law we must apply is that which the state supreme court would
apply. In a given case we may choose to follow an intermediate
appellate ruling, but we may not end our analysis of state law with mere
citation 1o such rulings where we are persuaded that the state supreme
court would rule otherwise.2" 6
Judge Marshall believes that it is necessary to apply the law that the
state supreme court would apply to avoid creating an incentive for forum
shopping. The "state trial court" approach, he believes, invites forum
shopping because it requires the federal courts to give more weight to state
intermediate appellate decisions than would be given in the state system.
Three examples are offered.20 7
In a case in which no supreme court decision exists and the appellate
district [court] of proper state venue has not yet taken a position on an
issue... , [Judge Shadur] would require a federal court to follow the
law as declared by the other appellate districts ....However, the very
fact that the various Illinois appellate districts sometimes conflict on an
issue of law indicates the problem inherent in the state trial court approach. The appellate districts, it appears, do not consider each others'
decisions binding; rather, they regard them as persuasive authority only.
Thus, if a litigant filed suit in a state court in the First District and the
only intermediate appellate decision on a pertinent issue was from the
Fourth District, while the trial court presumably would follow the
Fourth District ruling, on appeal the First District would not necessarily
do so, if it found persuasive reasons to do otherwise. In such a case, if
diversity of citizenship existed, the litigant favored by the Fourth
District rule could file the case in federal court (or remove it, if there
was diversity of citizenship, in the case of a non-Illinois defendant) and
thereby obtain 'insurance' that the favorable rule of law would be
applied and upheld on appeal, were ...[Judge Shadur's holding] to
20 8
apply.
As a second example, Judge Marshall points out that even where "First
District law" exists, the First District has five divisions which do not

206. Id. at 539-40 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
207. Id. at 540.
208. Id. at 540-41 (citations omitted).
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consider themselves bound by the holdings of other divisions. Thus,.Judge
Shadur's rule "permits a diversity litigant in whose favor the non-unanimous
but not as yet uncontradicted rule runs to obtain 'insurance' by bringing the
case in federal court or removing it there." ' 9
The third type of forum shopping Judge Shadur's rule was said to permit
is somewhat more subtle. His rule requires federal courts to give more
weight to state appellate decisions than the rendering courts themselves
would give them. According to Judge Marshall, the "state law" that Erie
requires him to follow includes the power to re-examine earlier holdings
based upon "data" not considered in the earlier decision. Erie, he believes,
permits a federal court to exercise the same authority.2"'
Judge Marshall then quotes Wright, Miller, and Cooper for the
proposition that Judge Shadur's rule would result in merely substituting one
kind of forum shopping for another. The lawyer depending on old or shaky
precedent would bring his case into federal court secure in the knowledge
that the federal court would follow the old state rule.2 ' According to
Judge Marshall, Judge Shadur's rule permits forum shopping because a
federal court is required to give state intermediate precedent more weight
that it would carry in other state appellate courts and "even in the rendering
panel itself."2 2
Besides encouraging forum shopping, Judge Shadur's rule was said to
be wasteful of both the litigants' and the courts' resources. Where a state
appellate court has ignored a critically important "datum" of state law (as
Marshall thought the state intermediate appellate courts had done in some
of the precedents being urged on him when he heard Kelly v. Stratton"3 ),
it has caused the state court to reach a result that was incorrect as a matter
of state law. The Shadur rule, according to Marshall, would require him to
follow the appellate court ruling and reach a similarly erroneous result,
despite the existence of persuasive reasons for believing that the state
supreme court would not so hold. The result would require the district court
to commit error and leave it to the court of appeals (which would then act
209. Roberts, 568 F. Supp. at 541.
210. Id. Ironically, for similar reasons Judge Shadur did not feel bound by his own
court of appeals or "even one or two bits of language in United States Supreme Court
opinions supporting that predictive approach," because the United States Supreme Court had
not considered certain data in making those early decisions. See Rizzo v. Means Serv., Inc.,
632 F. Supp. 1115, 1131 (N.D. 111.1986); see infra notes 226-27 and accompanying text.
211. Roberts, 568 F. Supp. at 541-42 (citing 19 PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note
144, at 89-91).
212. Id. at 542.
213. 552 F. Supp. 641, 646-48 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
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as the state appellate court) to correct the error. So read, Judge Shadur's
rule was said to elevate form over substance and promote the needless
expenditure of courts' and litigants' resources.214
[T]he central principle is that we must give appellate court holdings
their due where the supreme court has not spoken, but we must not give
them more than their due. This will require resort to the 'Supreme
Court predictive approach,' but to do otherwise would be to ignore the
policy of Erie and its progeny. That policy is the avoidance of forum
shopping. When we apply the law that ultimately would be applied
were the case litigated in state court, we are fully faithful to Erie. By
contrast, to act as a state trial court, following intermediate appellate
decisions that are erroneous as a matter of state law, not only would
violate the policy of Erie, but would also elevate form over substance,
as the court of appeals, assuming the role of its state counterpart, would
apply the correct rule of state law. Erie requires us, in all cases, to
apply the rule of law that the state supreme court would follow.2"'
216
2. The Shadur Rule.-Just Another State Trial Court

Judge Shadur's view is that a federal judge faced with a problem of
state law should decide the case the same way as his state court counterpart
would in the courthouse down the street. Since the state judge would be
bound by an opinion of an appellate court whose geographical territory
included the city where the state and federal courts sat, so should the federal
judge.
Why is this the duty of the federal trial judge under the Erie doctrine?
According to Judge Shadur, the answer is found in the Erie opinion,
buttressed by the opinions in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York 217 and Klaxon
v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co.2"' Judge Shadur writes:
Diversity of citizenship jurisdiction was conferred in order to prevent
apprehended discrimination in state courts against those not citizens of
the State. Swift v. Tyson introduced grave discrimination by non-citi-

214. Roberts, 568 F. Supp. at 542-43.
215. Id. at 543 (footnote omitted).
216. Judge Shadur's views are set forth in a series of opinions. One can get the essence
of his views from his opinions in Rizzo v. Means Servs., Inc., 632 F. Supp. 1115 (N.D. Ill.
1986); Abbott Laboratories v. Granite State Ins. Co., 573 F. Supp. 193 (N.D. II1.1983); and
Commercial Discount Corp. v. King, 552 F. Supp. 841 (N.D. 111.
1982).
217. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
218. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
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zens against citizens. It made rights enjoyed under the unwritten
'general law' vary according to whether enforcement was sought in the
state or in the federal court; and the privilege of selecting the court in
which the right should be determined was conferred upon the non-citizen. Thus, the doctrine rendered impossible equal protection of the law.
In attempting to promote uniformity of law throughout the United
States, the doctrine had prevented uniformity in the administration of
the law of the state.2t 9
Shadur cites Guaranty Trust as being in accord:
The nub of the policy that underlies Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins is that for
the same transaction the accident of a suit by a non-resident litigant in
a federal court instead of in a State
court a block away should not lead
22 °
to a substantially different result.

Judge Shadur also points out that the Klaxon case treated state "choiceof-law rule as substantive, not procedural, for Erie purposes. '22' Klaxon,
he said, required this because "[o]therwise, the accident of diversity of
citizenship would constantly disturb equal administration of justice in
coordinate state and federal courts sitting side by side. 22 2 Thus, Judge
Shadur reads Klaxon as commanding him to treat "internal" state choice of
law rules the same as Klaxon's treatment of external state choice of law
rules. This leads Judge Shadur to a position fundamentally different from
223
Judge Marshall.

219. Abbott, 573 F. Supp. at 197 (quoting Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74-75
(1938)).
220. Id. (quoting Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 109).
221. Id. at 197 (quoting Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496).
222. Id. (quoting Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496).
223. Professor Geri Yonover disagrees and contends that "not even the broadest reading
of Klaxon suggests that it embraces the stare decisis effect of [internal choice of law
decisions] on federal-as opposed to state-courts." She says that the Illinois internal choice
of law cases addressed their comments to state, not federal courts, and points out that in
1941, when Klaxon was decided, the prevailing choice of law rules used by state courts
reflected those found in the now discredited first RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS. Geri
J. Yonover, AscertainingState Law: The Continuing Erie Dilemma, 38 DEPAUL L. REv. 1,
34-35 (1989).
While it is true that the Illinois internal choice of law cases were addressed to state
courts, so are state external choice of law cases addressed by superior state courts to inferior
state courts. Moreover, although Klaxon was decided in the era of the first RESTATEMENT,
its principles were forcefully reaffirmed well into the era of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
when the Fifth Circuit was reversed after being tempted to make some modem innovations
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As in Florida, the Illinois internal choice of law rule of stare decisis
requires that all trial courts in the state be bound by the decision of the
appellate court of any district and by their own district court if there is a
conflict.224 Also, as in Florida, the Illinois district courts do not consider
themselves bound by the decisions of other districts.225
Judge Marshall feels bound by the rule of Bosch and the Seventh
Circuit to apply the state supreme court predictive approach when confronted with a litigant's claim that he is bound by an intermediate appellate court
decision.226 On the other hand, Judge Shadur considers himself free of
some of the binding effects of those cases because the courts that rendered
them did not take into consideration the internal choice of law rules that are
binding on Illinois state courts.
Judge Shadur answered the criticism of his method, in part, as follows:
This Court is of course aware of the opinions of some of its
colleagues who prefer the greater flexibility of trying to predict what the
Illinois Supreme Court would do if and when faced with the same kind
of conflict among Appellate Districts. And there are of course some
statements in opinions by our Court of Appeals (and even one or two
bits of language in United States Supreme Court opinions) supporting
that predictive approach. But not one of those statements has dealt in
terms with the situation (which may or may not be unique to Illinois)
where an integral part of Illinois substantive law-which we federal
judges are duty-bound to adhere to and follow under Erie-is a rule that
mandates every Illinois trial court to follow current opinions in its own
Appellate District, even if it might prefer the differing views of another
Appellate District (or even if it believed the Illinois Supreme Court,
on Texas' choice of law rules. See Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3
(1975).
It is hard to see how Judge Shadur can be faulted, therefore, for extrapolating from
Klaxon the general principle that federal courts, applying state law, are required to follow
state choice of law rules, whether internal or external.
224. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Yapejian, 605 N.E.2d 539, 542 (111.1992). At
the time Judge Shadur wrote his opinions, this rule had been adopted by some of the state
districts, but had not been approved by the Illinois Supreme Court. Since then, the Illinois
Supreme Court has cited those intermediate appellate opinions with apparent approval. Id.
(citing People v. Thorpe, 367 N.E.2d 960 (I11.App. Ct. 1977); Garcia v. Hynes & Howes
Real Estate, Inc., 331 N.E.2d 634 (I11.App. Ct. 1975)). These were the very same cases
relied upon by Judge Shadur in formulating his rule of intrastate choice of law rules.
225. See Mattis & Yalowitz, supra note 190, at 588-95, and cases cited therein.
226. Roberts, 568 F. Supp. at 540 (citing Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S.
456 (1967); In re Air Crash Disaster, 701 F.2d 1189, 1196-98 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 464 U S. 866 (1983)).
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given the opportunity, might opt for the other District's view) ....
Ordinarily the job of a state trial court, in the absence of controlling
state supreme court precedent, is to make its best effort to decide what
its supreme court would do if faced with the same problem. That task
really accounts for the opinions that express a federal court's responsibilities in the same terms where state law is to provide the rule of
decision. And that is so because of Erie itself and the very reason why
it mandated federal courts' adherence to state substantive law .... But
the same principle that informs Erie and its progeny compels a wholly
different approach where the duty of the state trial court is not
Supreme-Court-prediction but Appellate-Court-adherence. After all, .
. [internal choice of law cases] express at least as binding a substantive
law principle in Erie terms as the substantive doctrines of contract or
tort law we federal judges may be asked to choose between where the
intermediate state courts differ. And, not so incidentally, the . . .
[internal choice of law] rule is one as to which there is no split of
Illinois authority and there is no reason to believe that the Illinois
Supreme Court disagrees with the rule-indeed at least as recently as
1981 that court deliberately passed up the opportunity to announce a
different rule ....
[S]o long as Erie binds us, we are not free to pick and choose which
established state law doctrines we want to follow and which we do not
- to ignore the unequivocal [state] choice-of-law mandate in favor of
giving ourselves greater latitude in essaying to predict future Illinois
Supreme Court decisions where Illinois Appellate Districts differ on
rules of law. That latter approach fosters forum shopping in precisely
the way Erie sought to eliminate: by creating the prospect of differing
results for the diversity plaintiff who has a choice between filing suit in
one of two Clerk of Court's Offices four blocks apart on Chicago's
Dearborn Street, or for the diversity defendant who must decide whether
or not to remove a case from the northernmost of those courts to the
227
southernmost.

3. Another Thrust by Marshall
In one opinion Judge Marshall had criticized Judge Shadur's position
for, among other things, failing to take into account the lack of coincidence
of the geographical territory of the federal districts in Illinois and the

geographic territory of the state appellate districts. Judge Marshall pointed
out that the Eastern Division of the Northern District of Illinois comprises
not only Cook County but also several other counties, all of which lie in
227. Rizzo, 632 F. Supp. at 1131-32. This last "prediction" of Judge Shadur turned out
to be true. See Yapejian, 605 N.E.2d at 539.
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districts other than the First District. Moreover, in cases where all
defendants are non-residents, Illinois law permits the plaintiff to bring suit
in any county. Marshall writes:
Thus, ... [Judge Shadur's] approach is inconsistent with Erie in that it
might require a federal court to apply a rule of decision that would not
be used if plaintiff filed in state court. In fact, .

.

. [Judge Shadur's

rule] would enable a defendant to forum-shop by removing [actions] to
federal court ... [which are] brought in non-Cook County areas of the

Northern District of Illinois, in which ... [the defendant] wants to avail
itself of the law of the First District of the Illinois Appellate Court.228
[At this point the authors intrude into the debate to illustrate how the
lack of geographical coincidence applies also to Florida. See Appendix A].
4. The Shadur Sidestep
Judge Shadur subsequently modified his position to sidestep this
criticism of his approach. He indicated that his adherence to Illinois'
internal choice of law rules, regarding the binding effect on intermediate
appellate decisions on state trial courts,
should not be misread as automatically looking to the Illinois Appellate
Court for the First District just because this Court sits (in the literal
physical sense) within that District. Such an approach could of course
lead to exactly the same kind of forum shopping [which] Erie and this
Court seek to avoid. What proper analysis calls for is a two-step
inquiry:

First, the federal court must determine which is the proper

Appellate District to look to (in a case originally filed in this District
Court, that is a function of the Illinois venue provisions that would have
controlled the plaintiffs choice had the suit been filed in state court; in
a removed case, the location of the state court where suit was filed
provides the precise and obvious answer). Second, only then does the
federal court ascertain the applicable state law as in force in that
Appellate District (including, if relevant, the use of the . . . [state

internal choice-of-law] rule).229
5. Agreement on Intradistrict Conflicts
When there is a conflict between decisions of the same Illinois state

228. Kelly v. Stratton, 552 F. Supp. 641, 644-45 (N.D. I1. 1982).
229. Rizzo, 632 F. Supp. at 1132-33.
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district appellate court, Judge Shadur takes the position that he should then
rule as he thinks the state supreme court would rule.23
G. Florida Federal Courts
Most federal courts agree with Judge Marshall's view that federal
courts should decide issues of state law based on the way they think those
issues would be decided by the highest court in the state-while at the same
time giving proper deference to state intermediate appellate court decisions."' One commentator who recently reviewed the problem says that,
"[e]xtensive research has disclosed only two cases in which other federal
judges perceive their Erie role as somewhat akin to Judge Shadur's
view. '
However, to the extent that those two cases can be considered
"holdings," they are binding on federal courts in Florida.233
In Farmer v. Travelers Indemnity Co.,234 the Fifth Circuit panel said:
Although not all Florida District Courts of Appeal have decided the
question and the matter may be finally resolved as a matter of Florida
law by the Florida Supreme Court, the Second District Court of Appeal
has decided the matter. A state action by this Lee County plaintiff
would have been reviewed by the Second District. Undoubtedly the
trial court and the Second District would have followed the recent
Second District opinion. Thus, the same law has been applied in federal
court as would have been applied
in the specific courts available to
235

plaintiff in the state system.

The Farmer court would not certify the question to the Florida Supreme
Court, warning that: "It is not the proper office of the certification procedure
to permit a party, by choosing a federal over a state forum, to get the

230. Bonanno v. Potthoff, 527 F.Supp. 561, 563 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Commercial Discount
Corp. v. King, 552 F. Supp. 841, 845 (N.D. II1. 1982).
231. See generally 19 PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 144, at 88-103.
232. Yonover, supra note 223, at 28 n.184.
233, Farmer v. Travelers Indem. Co., 539 F.2d 562 (5th Cir. 1976), and Peoples Bank
v. Roberts, 779 F.2d 1544 (11 th Cir. 1986), both involved federal courts applying Florida
state law. The Eleventh Circuit has ruled that Fifth Circuit cases decided before September
30, 1981, are binding on judges within the Eleventh Circuit. See Bonner v. City of Prichard,
661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc). The Bonner case also adopted the Fifth Circuit
rule that "a prior decision of the circuit (panel or en banc) could not be overruled by a panel
but only by the court sitting en banc." Id. at 1209.
234. Farmer, 539 F.2d at 562.
235. Id. at 563 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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Florida Supreme Court's attention through this Court to issues which that
Court [the Florida Supreme Court] has refused to accept from state
'
litigants."236
Farmerwas easy; there were two intermediate appellate cases that had
both decided the same way. The only two United States Supreme Court
cases cited by the court were Erie and Hanna v. Plumer.17 Hanna had
little to do with determining
the content of state law, but it did mention the
238
"twin aims" of Erie.
The Eleventh Circuit case of Peoples Bank v. Roberts2 39 presented a
slightly more: complex problem, while at the same time predicting that more
complex problems were to come. The question of state law had been
decided the same way by all five state appellate courts of appeal. Only one
case had deviated from the majority, a 1984 decision by the Third District.
An earlier Third District case, decided in 1976, had gone along with what
was then a unanimous majority. The case before the Eleventh Circuit would
have been reviewed by the Second District had it been brought in state
court, and that district went along with the majority. The Eleventh Circuit
panel said:
Although the intermediate court decisions are not unanimous, we accept
the overwhelming majority rule as controlling state law for two reasons:
First, there is no indication the Florida Supreme Court would decide the
issue otherwise, and second, it is the law that would have been applied
240
"in the specific courts available to plaintiff in the state system."
Peoples Bank was also a relatively easy case, but it began to sow the
seeds of a real dilemma. The first (Judge Marshall's view) and second
(Judge Shadur's view) reasons given in the paragraph above just happen to
be in harmony. However, the federal trial judge is faced with a dilemma
when he thinks the Florida Supreme Court would decide the case as the
majority had decided, but also believes that a different rule would be applied
in the specific courts available to plaintiff in the state system. In addition,
the Florida Supreme Court may have refused to review the issue for state
litigants.
Under the Florida certification procedure, the federal trial court cannot

236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 460; see also supra note 169 and accompanying text.
239. 779 F.2d 1544 (11th Cir. 1986).

240. Id. at 1546 (quoting Farmer,539 F.2d at 563).
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certify.24 ' The Eleventh Circuit has said that its panels are bound by Fifth
Circuit decisions, and the Fifth Circuit said, in Farmer,that it is not proper
to certify questions on issues which the Florida Supreme Court has refused
to accept from state litigants.24 2
To the extent that what the Fifth Circuit said in Farmer and what the
Eleventh Circuit said in Peoples Bank can be considered holdings, the
Eleventh Circuit may have just tied itself into a Gordian knot; a knot which
could only be cut by an en banc proceeding or by a United States Supreme
Court holding. True, there is language in both Farmer and Peoples Bank
which leaves it open for a court to follow the state supreme court predictive
approach. However, the opinions taken together are at best ambiguous.
A federal trial judge hearing a case with the same legal issue as the one
in Peoples Bank would be without guidance if the state court venue had
been the Third District. 4 3 Which part of the Peoples Bank holding should
the judge follow when there is no reason to believe that the Florida Supreme
Court would decide one way or the other? Should the judge follow the rule
of the majority, or the rule that would bind a state judge in the Third
District? 44 Although the matter is far from certain, it appears that Judge
Shadur's viewpoint 245 has at least some vitality in the Eleventh Circuit.
In many instances Florida provides for statewide venue.246 Of the
241. Of course, the trial judge could always certify the question to the Eleventh Circuit
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1992), and that court could then certify under article V, section
3(b)(6) of the Florida Constitution, Florida Statutes section 25.031 (1993), and Florida Rule
of Appellate Procedure 9.150.
242. Farmer, 539 F.2d at 563.
243. The problem raised in the substantive issue in PeoplesBank must have been fairly
common, otherwise it would not have been litigated so many times. Thus, it is not difficult
to believe that the problem arises often in Florida's most populous county, which is included
within the Third District.
244. The situation in PeoplesBank involved two Third District opinions: a 1976 case
that was in the majority, and a 1984 case that was the sole minority position among the
appellate courts. Does this provide the solution, or does it merely raise more questions?
Should the federal judge follow the later case on the theory that, as presently constituted, the
Third District today would be more likely to follow it, or should the judge follow the earlier
case, either because it was first, or because it is in the majority, or both? Although the
Supreme Court of Florida has said that the later panel overrules the former panel, State v.
Walker, 593 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 1992), this does not necessarily mean that the supreme court
itself would follow the holding of the second panel.
245. See supra notes 216-30 and accompanying text.
246. The general venue statute, Florida Statutes section 47.011 (1991), does not apply
to non-residents. Thus, transitory state court actions may be brought against non-residents
in any county. Corporations, domestic and foreign, who do business on a statewide basis are
particularly vulnerable to suit in almost any of the five appellate districts under Florida
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three federal districts in Florida, only the northern is located entirely within
one state appellate district.247 What is supposed to happen, under the
Farmer and Peoples Bank holdings, when venue is properly laid in United
States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, and the same suit
could have been filed properly in a state court in either the First, Second,
or Fifth Districts of the state appellate system? If there are conflicting
decisions among those state districts, which should be applied? Should it
matter whether the case was brought originally to the federal court, or
whether it was removed there? For example, in Farmer, the Fifth Circuit
was reviewing a case from the federal district court of the Middle District
of Florida. The federal Middle District includes counties within the venue
of the state's First, Second, and Fifth District Courts of Appeal.248 The
Farmer court said that a state action by "this Lee County plaintiff would
'
have been reviewed by the Second District,"249
which would have followed the recent Second District opinion that the Fifth Circuit applied. The
assumption is that the Lee County plaintiff would have filed any state action
in Lee County within the second district. The plaintiff might well have
found state 'venue proper for a suit against the corporate defendant in
Osceola County, which is within the Fifth District, and brought his
hypothetical state action there. If the Fifth District substantive rule
conflicted with the Second District rule, how would the federal Middle
District judge know which to apply, since, in fact, the Lee County plaintiff
did not actually file in any state court?
One more possibility exists, which if not a Gordian knot is at least a
jurisprudentially awkward situation. Under Judge Shadur's view the same
judge may apply the law of Florida differently to similar cases. The federal
Southern District includes counties within the venue of the state's Second,
Third, and Fourth District Courts of Appeal.25 ° Federal District Judge
Wisely, of the Southern District of Florida, has two cases on her diversity
docket on a given day. They raise identical questions of law. The "proper
venue" of the one, if it had been brought in state court, would be Dade
County in the state's Third District. The proper venue of the other would
have been in Broward County in the Fourth District. Decisions of the courts
of appeal for the Third District conflict with those of the Fourth District.
Judge Wisely rules in favor of one plaintiff and the next hour in the same

Statutes section 47.051 (1991).
247. See Appendix A.
248. See id.
249. Farmer, 539 F.2d at 563.
250. See Appendix A.
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courtroom rules against the other plaintiff. These results might be difficult
to explain to laypersons, seeking equality under "the law of Florida."25 '
Neither the United States Supreme Court nor the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals has considered these issues of applying state law where there are
intrastate conflicts.
H. Can the Dilemma be Avoided-Abstention and
25 2
Certification
There are some instances where federal courts can avoid deciding
issues of state law, and thus avoid the problem of conflicting state appellate
court decisions. In certain cases it is appropriate for a federal court to
abstain from deciding the case. However, cases where abstention is proper
are relatively rare.2" 3 The Supreme Court has held that "the difficulties
of ascertaining what the state courts may hereafter determine the state law
to be do not in themselves afford a sufficient ground for a federal court to
decline to exercise its jurisdiction to decide a case which is properly brought
to it for decision. 254
In some instances the dilemma can be avoided through the process of
certification of questions of state law to the Florida Supreme Court.255

251. Where interstate conflicts exist, similar results could occur. For example, where
multiple parties are involved in one occurrence, different state laws may apply to different
parties. However, that situation strikes the objective observer less heavily because different
substantive rules among states are inherent in the federal system.
252. Only 12 states and the District of Columbia lack some certification procedure. Of
those that have adopted it, eight (including Florida) make certification of questions of state
law to the highest state court available only to federal circuit courts and the United States
Supreme Court. The other states and Puerto Rico allow certification by federal district
courts. Thirteen states and Puerto Rico allow certification from courts of other states. See
Yonover, supra note 223, at 16-17 (citing the various state statutes, rules, and constitutional
provisions dealing with certification).
253. For a discussion of the various abstention doctrines, see 17A PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, supra note 144, §§ 4241-47.
254. Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943).
255. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(6); FLA. STAT. § 25.031 (1993); FLA. APP. R. 9.150.
On the process of certification, see generally Larry M. Roth, Certified Questionsfrom the
FederalCourts: Review and Re-proposal,34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1979); Robert B. Lillich
& Raymond T. Mundy, FederalCourt Certificationof Doubtful State Law Questions, 18
UCLA L. REV. 888 (1971); Vincent L. McKusick, Certification: A Procedure for
CooperationBetween State and FederalCourts, 16 ME. L. REV. 33 (1964); 17A Practice and
Procedure, supra note 144, § 4248. One problem with certification is that it has the potential
for creating long delays in adjudication of private disputes. See Brian Mattis, Certification
of Questions of State Law: An Impractical Tool in the Hands of the FederalCourts, 23 U.
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However, Florida's federal trial courts are not permitted to certify questions
of state law to the Florida Supreme Court. Only federal appellate courts and
the United States Supreme Court have that privilege. Given the limited
jurisdiction of the Florida Supreme Court available to state litigants, it may
be that federal court certification is the best strategy for a litigant to get a
question answered by the Florida Supreme Court.256 This strategy may
give federal litigants an advantage over state litigants. It may further
disadvantage all state litigants by tying up the supreme court's docket with
federally certified questions. 57
Though some problems can be avoided by use of abstention and
certification., those devices are of only limited utility given the myriad of
problems surrounding conflicting state appellate decisions. Abstention is
usually inappropriate or forbidden, and certification is often impractical-if
not for the litigants," 8 then for the courts that are involved.
I.

When Abstention is Unavailable and Certification
Impractical-What Then?

What should a federal judge do when faced with conflicting decisions
by state intermediate appellate courts? Is Judge Marshall correct in saying
that he is bound by Bosch and the decisions of his circuit court to follow the
state supreme court predictive approach; or, is Judge Shadur right when he
says that he is not bound by those same holdings because those courts did

MIAMI L. REV. 717 (1969).

256. But see supra text accompanying note 236.
257. In Thiry v. Atlantic Monthly Co., 445 P.2d 1012 (Wash. 1968), a question of state
law had been certified by a United States District Court to the Supreme Court of Washington.
An obviously disgruntled Judge Hale dissented, and stated: "The question of speed, of
course, gives rise to another question of policy. At the time the instant case was argued in
this court .... this court had pending a backlog of approximately 700 cases, some of which
were of high precedential value and of exigent importance to the parties." Id. at 1014-15
(Hale, J., dissenting).
258. See Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 228 (1960) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting), rev'd on other grounds, 377 U.S. 179 (1964).
Some litigants have long purses. Many, however, can hardly afford one lawsuit,
let alone two. Shuttling-the parties between state and federal tribunals is a sure
way of defeating the ends of justice. The pursuit of justice is not an academic
exercise. There are no foundations to finance the resolution of nice state law
questions involved in federal court litigation. The parties are entitled-absent
unique and rare situations-to adjudication of their rights in the tribunals which
Congress has empowered to act.
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not consider the problem in the context of states' internal choice of law
rules?
Since the United States Supreme Court has never addressed the
problem, it seems that the only way to solve it is to use a United States
Supreme Court predictive approach. Would the United States Supreme
Court hold that in deciding issues of state law, consideration should be
given to a state's internal choice of law rules? Should it matter whether a
state has a viable certification process whereby federal courts can certify
questions of state law to the highest state court? These and similar
questions can only be answered by the United States Supreme Court. If the
past is any guide, it may take years for the answers to come.
Meanwhile, state and federal judges (and no doubt many lawyers)
deplore the problem of conflicting intermediate appellate court decisions.
Judge Marshall has mentioned "the confusion engendered by the failure of
the various districts and divisions of the appellate court to follow each
others' rulings ....[259] While this is perhaps lamentable, it nevertheless
reflects 'state law' within the meaning of Erie and we are therefore required
260
to take account of it."
Similar concern was expressed by Florida Supreme Court Justice James
C. Adkins concurring in the adoption of the Florida Rules of Appellate
Procedure. While concurring in their adoption, Justice Adkins pointed out
that
the present rules of appellate procedure fail to solve a problem which
is causing confusion in the case law of Florida. The district courts of
appeal are frequently expressly recognizing in opinions that a decision
is in conflict with a sister district court. Unless one of the parties
brings a petition for certiorari to this Court the conflict remains in the
reported case law and the trial judge is faced with the dilemma of
selecting one of two conflicting district courts of appeals decisions as
the proper case law. The law is unsettled.26'

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The Florida legal system has a long history of cooperation with the

259. Roberts v. Westem-Southern Life Ins. Co., 568 F. Supp. 536, 541 n.8 (N.D. Ill.
1983) (citing Mattis & Yalowitz, supra note 190, at 571).
260. Id.
261. The FloridaBar Re: Rules of Appellate Procedure,463 So. 2d at 1123-25 (Adkins,
J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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federal judiciary. Florida was the first state to have a process whereby
federal courts could certify questions of Florida law to the state supreme
court. Florida was the first state to have that process approved by the
United States Supreme Court.
The Florida Legislature adopted its
certification statute in 1945.262 In Clay v. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd.,263
Justice Frankfurter credited the Florida Legislature with "rare foresight" in
dealing with "the problem of authoritatively determining unresolved state
law involved in federal litigation by [enacting] a statute which permits a
federal court to certify such a doubtful question of state law to the Supreme
Court of Florida for its decision. 264 The statute lay dormant until the
United States Supreme Court suggested, in the Clay opinion, that Florida
adopt a procedure for its use. A procedure was adopted, 265 and the state
2 66
law question in Clay was certified to the Supreme Court of Florida.
Subsequently, the procedure was made part of the state constitution.267
Florida is a cosmopolitan state and much of the work of the relevant
federal courts is the business of Florida. Nonetheless, the burden of this
article is not to suggest changes in Florida's stare decisis approach merely
to facilitate the work of federal judges who must apply "the law of Florida."
All Florida citizens, those who litigate in state courts as well as federal
courts and those who plan transactions to which Florida law might apply,
will benefit by a greater respect for the effect of the doctrine of stare decisis
on court decisions. We recommend that horizontal precedential effect be
accorded to decisions of Florida's courts of appeal. We begin by examining
the experience of a state where that solution has been tried.
A. A Modelfor Statewide Stare Decisis
Until about three years ago, the problem of unresolved conflicts among
decisions of Michigan's intermediate appellate court had become scandalous.26 Although that state has only one such court, the Michigan Court
of Appeals, '69 the twenty-four judges2.. are elected from three judicial
262. FLA. STAT. § 25.031 (1946).
263. 363 U.S. at 207.
264. Id. at 212 (citing FLA. STAT. § 25.031 (Supp. 1957)).
265. FLA. R. APP. P. 4.61 (current version at FLA. R. ApP. P. 9.150).
266. Sun Ins, Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So. 2d 735, 737 (Fla. 1961).
267. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(6).
268. Edward M. Wise, The Legal Culture of Troglodytes: Conflicts between Panels of
the Court of Appeals, 37 WAYNE L. REv. 313 (1991); see also Mattis, Stare Decisis
Michigan, supra note 191, at 265.
269. MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 1.
270. Micti. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.301 (Supp. 1993).
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districts27' and sit, rotating in several locations around the state, in panels
of three. 72 Before November 1, 1990, the stare decisis rules in Michigan
were: 1) all trial courts were bound by the decision of a panel of the court
of appeals (vertical stare decisis obtained), but 2) one panel of the court of
appeals was not bound by the decision of any other panel (horizontal stare
decisis was not honored). 273 The similarity between Michigan's pre-1990
approach and Florida's present approach, despite the difference in judicial
structure, is manifested in a quotation often repeated in Michigan cases that
sounds like Chief Justice Barkett's recent statement about Florida stare
decisis. The Michigan Court of Appeals stated:
While decisions of this Court [of appeals] are not precedent setting in
the sense that subsequent panels of this Court are bound to follow
earlier opinions, "a decision of any division of this Court is controlling
statewide until a contrary decision is reached by another division on the
identical2 74 question or until such decision is reversed by the Supreme
Court.

Not surprisingly, a chaos of conflicting decisions reigned in MichiLater decisions did not purport to overrule prior inconsistent
decisions, but one panel would merely shrug off authority that it did not

gan. 275

271. Id.§ 600.302.
272. MICH. CT. R. 7.201(D), 7.201(F).
273. Mattis, Stare Decisis Michigan, supra note 191, at 272-85.
274. City of Detroit v. Recorder's Court Traffic & Ordinance Judge, 304 N.W.2d 829,
835 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (quoting Hackett v. Kress, 133 N.W.2d 221, 223 (Mich. Ct. App.
1965)).
Compare the Michigan quotation with Chief Justice Barkett's statement that the
decisions of the district courts of appeal represent the law of Florida unless and until they are
overruled by the supreme court, that in the absence of interdistrict conflict, district court
decisions bind all Florida trial courts, and that "[c]ontrarily, as between District Courts of
Appeal, a sister district's opinion is merely persuasive." Pardo v. State, 596 So. 2d 665, 66667 (Fla. 1992).
275. See Wise, supra note 268, at 318; see also Mattis, Stare Decisis Michigan, supra
note 191, at 274-301. For example, on the issue of whether a third party could testify about
an out-of-court identification of a criminal defendant made by another witness, the court of
appeals held such testimony inadmissible 12 times, admissible nine times, and one time it
declined to decide because of the harmless error rule. People v. Malone, 483 N.W.2d 470,
474 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (Connor, J., concurring) (citing People v. Newcomb, 476 N.W.2d
749, 752 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991), appeal denied, 483 N.W.2d 904 (Mich. 1992)). The
conflict was ultimately resolved by the court of appeals pursuant to Administrative Order No.
1990-6. See Newcomb, 476 N.W.2d at 752.
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choose to follow.276 Then in late 1990 the Supreme Court of Michigan... promulgated Administrative Order 1990-6 designed to end the crisis.2" It has succeeded very well.
The most dramatic part of Administrative Order 1990-6 is its first
sentence: "A panel of the Court of Appeals must follow the rule of law
established by a prior published decision of the Court of Appeals issued on
or after November 1, 1990."279 The published decision remains controlling authority unless reversed, modified, or overruled by the supreme court
or a special panel of the court of appeals. Provision is made for convening
a special panel where a panel indicates in the text of its opinion that it
follows a prior published decision only because it is required to do so by
Administrative Order 1990-6. In other words, the disgruntled panel may
trigger the conditions necessary for convening the special panel, but it must
follow the prior decision. The new order neatly avoids a conflict in the
appellate court. If a majority of the appellate judges believe that the issue
merits further attention, then twelve judges are selected who together with
the chief judge form the special panel. The panel decision is vacated and
the special panel resolves the matter by a decision that is binding statewide
upon the court of appeals as well as upon all lower courts, unless reversed
or modified by the Michigan Supreme Court.28 °
The horizontal stare decisis rule has worked well in Michigan. Without
the convening of a special panel, conflicts existing before November 1,
1990, have been resolved in numerous cases..' by a published panel

276. Mattis, Stare Decisis Michigan, supra note 191, at 274-99.

Dean Wise's

observation that refusing to follow a prior decision is in fact no different from overruling it,
is highly persuasive. Wise, supra note 268, at 321.
277. The supreme court shall prescribe the rules for the practice and procedure of the
court of appeals. MICH. CONST. art. 6, § 10.

278. Administrative Order No. 1990-6, 436 Mich. lxxxiv (1990), was effective
November 1, 1990, and was to remain in effect until December 31, 1991. It was continued
in effect by Administrative Order No. 1991-11,439 Mich. cxliv (1991), until December 31,
1992, and by Administrative Order No. 1992-8, 441 Mich. lii (1992), until December 31,
1993. See Jennings v. Southwood, 499 N.W.2d 460, 464 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (Neff, J.,
concurring).
279. Administrative Order No. 1990-6, 436 Mich. xxxiv (1990).
280. Id. A petition to convene a special panel is not a prerequisite to filing an
application for leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court from the panel decision. Id.
281. Gonyea v. Motor Parts Fed. Credit Union, 480 N.W.2d 297 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991)
(cited in Rouch v. Enquirer & News of Battle Creek Michigan, 487 N.W.2d 205, 221 (Mich.
1992) (Riley, ,, concurring) as "controlling authority" and "binding precedent") (followed
in Prysak v. R.L.. Polk Co., 483 N.W.2d 629, 636 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992)); People v. Lannom,
480 N.W.2d 321 (Mich. Ct. App.), aftj'd, 490 N.W.2d 396, 398 (Mich. 1992) (per curiam).
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decision issued after November 1, 1990, that pursuant to Administrative
Order 1990-6 binds all panels.282 Conflicts that would have been created
were it not for Administrative Order 1990-6 have been avoided in cases
where the deciding panel expressly indicated that but for Administrative
Order 1990-6 it would rule contrary to a prior decision.2" 3 In many other

One justice would have denied leave to appeal to the supreme court because the split of
authority in the court of appeals was resolved by a "first out" opinion under the Administrative Order. Id. at 399 (Levin, J., separate opinion). Michigan Millers Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Bronson Plating Co., 496 N.W.2d 373 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992), appealgranted, 506 N.W.2d
877 (1993); People v. Gardner, 487 N.W.2d 515 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (noting case
discussed and followed in People v. Parr, 494 N.W.2d 768, 771 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992)
(Corrigan, J., concurring) (questioning the majority analysis of Gardner), appeal denied, 505
N.W.2d 585 (Mich. 1993)); Rouse v. Wesley, 494 N.W.2d 7 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992), appeal
denied, 503 N.W.2d 440 (Mich. 1993); Auto Club Ins. Ass'n v. Frederick & Herrud, Inc.,
479 N.W.2d 18 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (resolving on remand a complex ERISA issue,
according to Wolverine Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rospatch Corp. Employee Benefit Plan, 489 N.W.2d
204, 207 n.3 (Mich. Ct. App.1992)), appeal granted, 491 N.W.2d 571 (Mich. 1992); Brown
v. Brown, 480 N.W.2d 292 (1991 ) (seeking grandparents' visitation rights); People v. Landt,
469 N.W.2d 37 (Mich. Ct. App.), rev'd, 475 N.W.2d 825 (Mich. 1991) (noting discussion
in People v. Schollaert, 486 N.W.2d 312, 317 n.5 (Mich. Ct. App.), appeal denied, 494
N.W.2d 750 (Mich. 1992)); People v. Punga, 465 N.W.2d 53 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991);
Postema v. Postema, 471 N.W.2d 912 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (resolving long-standing
conflict regarding postgraduate degree as a divisible marital asset); Smith v. Michigan Bell
Tel. Co., 472 N.W.2d 32 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
282. The rule that a post November 1, 1990, decision of a panel binds all panels of the
court of appeals is now well accepted. In addition to the results and language of the cases
cited in notes 239-40 supra, the court of appeals sometimes notes that its decision creates a
new rule of law that will bind in the future. E.g., Borman v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,
499 N.W.2d 419, 422 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (following apre-Administrative Order decision);
Brown v. Yousif. 499 N.W.2d 446, 450 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993); Rowell v. Security Steel
Processing Co., 491 N.W.2d 265, 266 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992), appeal granted in part, 500
N.W.2d 469 (Mich. 1993).
283. The court in Fetz Eng'g Co. v. Ecco Sys., Inc., 471 N.W.2d 85, 87 (Mich. Ct. App.
1991), vacated, 483 N.W.2d 619 (Mich. 1992), said that the precedent case was wrongly
decided and that it followed that case only because it was required to do so by Administrative
Order No. 1990-6. A petition to submit Fetz to a special panel pursuant to Administrative
Order No. 1990-6 was denied. The supreme court granted leave to appeal, (as explained in
Dane Constr., Inc. v. Royal's Wine & Deli, Inc., 480 N.W.2d 343, 344 n.l (Mich. Ct. App.
1991), appeal denied, 486 N.W.2d 747 (Mich. 1992)), vacated the court of appeals opinion,
and remanded to the trial court. Fetz, 483 N.W.2d at 619.
Other cases where a conflict would have been created but for Administrative Order No.
1990-6 are: People v. Hadley, 501 N.W.2d 219 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (dissenting judge
believed prior decisions were distinguishable); Generou v. Kalamazoo Regional Psychiatric
Hosp., 480 N.W.2d 638, 639 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991), appeal denied, 486 N.W.2d 733 (Mich.
1992); People v. Martinez, 485 N.W.2d 124 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992); Askwith v. City of Sault

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss2/20

54

1994]

Mattis and Mattis: Erie and Florida Law Conflict at the Crossroads: The Constitution
Mattis / Mattis
1387

cases the reluctant compliance of a panel in following a prior published
panel decision under Administrative Order 1990-6 indicates that a conflict
might well have been created but for the order. 84 A jurisprudentially
sound deference for stare decisis is manifested in those cases that merely
follow the horizontal precedent as required by the Administrative Order,
without further significant comment.285

Ste. Marie, 477 N.W.2d 448 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (concurring judge believed that precedent
case was correctly decided); Makky v. General Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 486 N.W.2d 309
(Mich. Ct. App. 1992), appeal denied, 508 N.W.2d 507 (Mich. 1993); Benson v. Callahan
Mining Corp., 479 N.W.2d 12 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991), appeal denied, 485 N.W.2d 501
(Mich. 1992).
284. E.g., Jenerou v. Jenerou, 503 N.W.2d 744 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993); People v. Stein,
Nos. 142771, 88-502, 1993 WL 195679 (Mich. Ct. App. June 8, 1993); Warden v. Fenton
Lanes, Inc., 495 N.W.2d 849, 854 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992), appeal granted in part, 506
N.W.2d 877 (Mich. 1993); People v. Landis, 494 N.W.2d 865 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992),
appeal denied, 505 N.W.2d 584 (Mich. 1993); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Fisher, 481
N.W.2d 743, 746 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991), appeal denied, 496 N.W.2d 294 (Mich. 1993).
285. E.g., Jennings v. Southwood, 499 N.W.2d 460 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993); Lombardi
v. William Beaumont Hosp., 502 N.W.2d 736, 741 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (noting that to the
extent the "suggesting" in a later 1991 decision conflicted with an earlier 1991 decision, the
earlier 1991 decision "is controlling authority under Administrative Order Nos. 1990-6 and
1992-8, since the Sobh [earlier] preceded the Bachula [later] by several months"); People v.
Cutchall, 504 N.W.2d 666, 672 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (following People v. Buck, 496
N.W.2d 321 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992), without further comment; concurring opinion would rule
otherwise were it not for the prior decision); People v. Gallego, 502 N.W.2d 358 (Mich. Ct,
App. 1993); Holland v. Liedel, 494 N.W.2d 772, 775 n.1 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992), appeal
denied, 503 N.W.2d 910 (Mich. 1993); Keen v. Keen, 486 N.W.2d 105, 106 (Mich. Ct. App.
1992); Pavlov v. Community Emergency Medical Serv., Inc., 491 N.W.2d 874, 879 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1992) appeal denied, 500 N.W.2d 478 (Mich. 1993); People v. Buck, 496 N.W.2d
321, 334 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992), appeal denied, 498 N.W.2d 742 (Mich. 1993) (following
post-Administrative Order decisions of panels of the court of appeals on three issues, one of
which was then pending before the supreme court: "until such time as our Supreme Court
decides the issue, we are bound by Deans"); People v. Malone, 483 N.W.2d 470, 472 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1992), appeal granted in part, 500 N.W.2d 470 (Mich. 1993); People v. Spearman,
491 N.W.2d 606, 611 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992), appeal denied, 497 N.W.2d 188 (Mich.), revd
inpartsub nom. People v. Rush 504 N.W.2d 185 (Mich. 1993); Prysak v. R.L. Polk.Co., 483
N.W.2d 629, 636 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992); Reese v. County of Wayne, 483 N.W.2d 671, 672
(Mich. Ct. App.) (seeing "no reason to disagree"), appeal denied, 495 N.W.2d 382 (Mich.
1992); Richardson v. Warren Consol. School Dist., 496 N.W.2d 380, 382 (Mich. Ct. App.
1992); Thompson v. Fitzpatrick, 501 N.W.2d 172 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992), appeal denied, 503
N.W.2d 911 (Mich. 1993); People v. Milton, 478 N.W.2d 740 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991), appeal
denied, 494 N.W.2d 745 (Mich. 1992); People v. Williams, 477 N.W.2d 877 (Mich. Ct. App.
1991), appeal denied, 479 N.W.2d 697 (Mich. 1992); People v. Williams, 473 N.W.2d 727
(Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (following a post-Administrative Order published panel decision that
was later overruled by special panel in People v. Hill, 480 N.W.2d 913 (Mich. Ct. App.
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In the almost three years of the operation of Administrative Order
1990-6 special panels have convened only three times.286 Were it not for
Administrative Order 1990-6, the Supreme Court of Michigan would have
had the duty to resolve conflicts not only in these three cases but in the
many others that the court of appeals resolved and avoided without special
287
panel treatment.
Even though Administrative Order 1990-6 has proved generally

1991), appeal denied, 480 N.W.2d 909 (Mich. 1992) in a seven to six decision), appeal
denied, 478 N.W.2d 473 (Mich. 1991); Yarrick v. Village of Kent City, 473 N.W.2d 774,
775 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991), vacated, 489 N.W.2d 82 (Mich. 1992).
Occasionally a panel follows horizontal precedent noting that it agrees with the prior
decision. E.g., Wolverine Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rospatch Corp. Employee Benefit Plan, 489
N.W.2d 204, 207 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992); People v. Watts, 464 N.W.2d 715, 716 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1991), appeal denied, 478 N.W.2d 90 (Mich. 1991); National Indem. Co. v. Budget
Rent-A-Car Sys[s]., Inc., 489 N.W.2d 175, 177 n.I (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (agreeing with and
following what was arguably dicta).
It would be difficult to ascertain the exact number of cases that have followed prior
panel precedent because many decisions are unpublished. Of course, a panel is bound by
post-November 1, 1990, published decisions, even though the deciding panel's decision is not
to be published. Administrative Order No. 1990-6, 436 Mich. lxxxiv (1990); Keen v. Keen,
486 N.W.2d 105, 106 n.2 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992). Only published decisions, however, have
precedential effect under the rule of stare decisis. MICH. CT. R. 7.215(C)(1); see Makowski
v. Towles, 489 N.W.2d 133, 134 n.i (Mich. Ct. App. 1992); People v. Polus, 495 N.W.2d
402, 405 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992).
286. Maner v. Ford Motor Co., 493 N.W.2d 909 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (resolving four
year old conflict regarding deduction of other benefits from worker's compensation weekly
wage loss payments), affd, 502 N.W.2d 197 (Mich. 1993); People v. Brashier, 496 N.W.2d
385 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (resolving sixteen year old conflict regarding the definition of
"gross indecency"), appeal granted, 508 N.W.2d 490 (Mich. 1993); People v. Hill, 480
N.W.2d 913 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (noting justifications for sentencing judge's departure
from mandatory minimum sentences), appeal denied, 480 N.W.2d 909 (Mich. 1992).
287. Sometimes the supreme court must resolve a conflict among court of appeals
judges. One example is Bowie v. Arder, 490 N.W.2d 568 (Mich. Ct App. 1992). Panels of
the court of appeals were having difficulty interpreting whether a supreme court decision
related to the trial court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction or the parties' lack of standing.
The later of two post-Administrative Order panel decisions distinguished the earlier one and
said that the earlier interpretation of the supreme court decision was dicta. The supreme
court then had to decide whether its prior decision rested on a lack of standing or subject
matter jurisdiction. Id.
Following two post-Administrative Order panel decisions taking different viewpoints
on whether a minor's estate as well as the minor's family could recover under the dramshop
act (the latter labeling the former's interpretation dicta), the supreme court reversed both
decisions and held that neither the estate nor the family could recover. See LaGuire v. Kain,
487 N.W.2d 389 (Mich. 1992); Estate of Kuikstra v. Cheers Good Time Saloons, Inc., 489
N.W.2d 468 (Mich. 1992).
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successful, it was originally issued over the dissent of Justice Boyle. She
objected that "[s]uch a momentous change in the legal culture of this state
should be preceded by full research and study of such matters as the
experience with the conflict question in the intermediate courts of appeals
of our sister states ....."" Florida has an opportunity for such research

and study during the years before the convening of the constitution revision
commission. ' s' The horizontal, or statewide stare decisis model may prove
useful.
The similarity between Michigan's pre-1990 approach and Florida's
present approach, despite the difference in judicial structure, has been
noted.2 90 We may now ask whether, in view of the difference in judicial
structure, the conflict avoidance technique of a state with a unitary appellate
court could be utilized in a state with multiple appellate courts. If a
horizontal stare decisis model is desirable and practicable, we must then

288. Administrative Order No. 1990-6, 436 Mich. lxxxiv, lxxxvi (1990).
289. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 2. Under article XI, section 2, of the Florida Constitution,
the constitution revision commission will convene in 1998.
Other states where studies have been done include Illinois and New Mexico. Illinois
is a unitary appellate court state, but unlike Michigan, it has not adopted horizontal stare
decisis. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § I. The judges of the Appellate Court of Illinois are elected
from five judicial districts and each district must have at least one division to which at least
three judges are assigned. Id. §§ 2,5. No action has been taken to change the judge-made
rules that a decision of the appellate court is not binding on the appellate court in "other
appellate districts," and is binding on the trial courts throughout the state. State Farm Fire
& Casualty Co. v. Yapejian, 605 N.E.2d 539, 542 (Ill. 1992). The appellants in a more
recent case contended that conflicts within the appellate court constituted grounds for
reversal. See Brief for Appellant at 2, 12-15, Roach v. Springfield Clinic, 623 N.E.2d 246
1993). The supreme court, however, did not mention equal protection arguments in its
(I11.
opinion. See Roach v. Springfield Clinic, 623 N.E.2d 246 (III. 1993). Interestingly enough,
however, the Illinois Supreme Court had previously talked in clear equal protection language
a few years before when it said that "by granting these [Third District] defendants a new
trial, we would be unfairly discriminatingagainst other similarly situated defendants.., who
happened to be tried outside the third district." People v. Harris, 526 N.E.2d 335, 341 (I11.
1988), cert. denied sub nom. Wilson v. Illinois, 488 U.S. 902 (1988) (emphasis added). On
the Illinois experience, see generally Mattis & Yalowitz, supranote 190, at 571 (advocating
conflict avoidance); J. Timothy Eaton. et al., Resolving Conflicts in the Illinois Appellate
Court, 78 ILL. B .J. 182 (1990) (recommending conflict resolution by a special panel ofjudges
from the appellate court); see also Taylor Mattis, Precedential Value of Decisions of the
Court ofAppeals of the State of New Mexico, 22 N.M. L. REv. 535, 538 (1992) (discussing
instructive dialogue between two New Mexico intermediate appellate court judges, found in
State v. Bothne, No. 13,425 (N.M. Ct. App. Dec. 4), cert. denied, 822 P.2d 671 (N.M.
1991)).
290. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
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inquire whether the change should be by supreme court rule or precedent or
by constitutional amendment.
B. Achieving Statewide Horizontal Stare Decisis in Florida
1. The Principle
We might begin with formulating a principle and regime. For the time
being, we shall call the former the Principle. The issue to be examined in
the following subsection is whether any change should be made by supreme
court rule or precedent or by constitutional amendment. The Principle
might be stated:
Any panel of a district court of appeal must follow the holding
of [or, the rule of law established by] a prior published decision
of any district court of appeal issued on or after [the effective
date of this enactment].
A choice of wording allows for consideration of which meaning is clearer:
a "rule of law established by" a prior decision, or "the holding of' a prior
decision. Either phrase would be more specific than "maintain[ing]
uniformity in the court's decisions," under Florida Rule of Appellate
Procedure 9.331, about which courts have a history of disagreement.29 '
Probably, the "holding of' a prior case is the preferable terminology, even
though legal scholars from law students to supreme court justices will
disagree about what was the holding of a particular case. That inherent
defect, if it is one, of the common-law system cannot be addressed here.
Consistent with Department of Legal Affairs v. District Court of
Appeal, 5th District,only prior published decisions of district courts would
be precedent.292 Adoption of the Principle would mean that a panel of any
district would be bound by the district court decision of its own or any other
district. The "law of the district" would be replaced by "the law of
Florida." The need for resolution of intradistrict conflicts would exist no
more, with the institution of statewide horizontal stare decisis.
Vertical stare decisis would continue, so that all trial courts would be
bound by any district decision. No longer would it be said that "absent a
conflicting district court decision," a trial court is bound. The dilemmas
now facing state and federal trial judges, federal appellate judges, as well as

291. See supra notes 108-18 and accompanying text.
292. 434 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 1983).
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litigants and legal counselors, would be eased.
Providing that published decisions have statewide precedential effect
only after a certain date would prevent the confusion that would otherwise
arise where conflicts presently exist. The district decision "first out" after
enactment of the Principle would resolve the old conflict and stand as
precedent for the future.
Let those who fear that uniformity of law within a particular jurisdiction means stagnation in the law293 be comforted. That has not been the
case in the jurisdictions that require horizontal stare decisis.114 The
foremost argument against that fear is that there is the Supreme Court of
Florida, which this recommendation does not suggest abolishing. A decision
made by the force of the Principle could be certified as a question of great
importance, under article V, section 3(b)(4), of the Florida Constitution, as
decisions in direct conflict with other district court decisions now are
certified. At least since 1956, a primary motivation of constitutional
amendments has been to free the supreme court to use its discretionary
jurisdiction to decide matters of important public policy.2 95 This proposal
would foster that goal. Under the present system, if the supreme court
chooses not to review, the conflict persists. Under the Principle, if the
supreme court chose not to review, no conflict would have been created in
the first place.
Moreover, even absent supreme court review, a decision of a district
court of appeal would not be carved in stone. Procedures would be
provided for a special en banc panel of district appellate judges to review
rules of law to which the supreme court had not spoken.
2. Some Details
Provision should be made to implement a procedure whereby a limited
number of district appellate judges could convene in a special en banc panel
and review certain district court decisions. To trigger eligibility for such
review, the panel opinion would have to state that the court is following a

293. See, e.g., Administrative Order No. 1990-6, 436 Mich. lxxxiv, lxxxvi-vii (1990)
(Boyle, J., dissenting) (stating "[c]onflict itself is neither bad or good; it may be an agent for
change or the source of chaos"). The authors could not disagree more with the first clause.
As for conflict's being an agent for change, a "bad" law uniformly applied within a
jurisdiction may well bring change more quickly than one applied willy-nilly to some parties
while other parties get the benefit of the "good" law.
294. Compare the experiences of the United States Courts of Appeals that require
horizontal stare decisis, as well as the experience of Michigan.
295. See Mattis, Stare Decisis Florida, supra note 23, at 144-45.
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prior published decision only because it is required by the Principle to do
SO.296 Upon the vote of a majority of the judges of the district courts,297
the special en banc panel would convene. Perhaps too detailed for this
article is the question of how many district judges should be on the en banc
panel, or where it should meet. However, a judge or judges from each of
the five districts should be included. Florida has already had experience
with large en banc panels. In the present system for resolving intradistrict
conflicts all the judges of each district-the thirteen judges of the First
District, the twelve of the Second, the eleven of the Third, the twelve of the
Fourth, and the nine of the Fifth- 298 are included in their respective intradistrict en banc panels. 299 Certainly the special en banc panel should not
include all the appellate judges. Perhaps the five chief judges might be
appropriate decision makers"' and Tallahassee an appropriate meeting
place. To the extent that convening a special en banc panel is burdensome,
serious consideration will be given to triggering the mechanism."' Under
the present system it is all too easy for a panel in one district, because of a
slight preference for a different rule of law, to create a conflict by disagreeing and choosing not to follow the decision of another district. The
administrative burden is a small price to pay if it will ameliorate the
problems previously discussed.
The statement that the court is following a prior published decision
only because it is required by the Principle should not automatically trigger
a vote by all appellate judges on whether en banc treatment is desirable.
Procedure could require that only an appellate judge could request the vote,
or it might allow the parties to petition for special en banc treatment.
Again, Florida could draw on its experience with intradistrict en banc
procedure to inform this decision. Under the present rule an intradistrict
hearing en banc may be ordered only by a district court on its motion, but
a rehearing en banc may be ordered by the court on its own motion or on

296. This might be called the "chopped hay" statement: The prior published decision
that we must swallow goes down like chopped hay.
297. This would mean a majority of the appellate judges who participate in the vote.
Cf In re Rule 9.331, Determination of Causes by a Dist. Court of Appeal En Banc, Florida
Rules of Appellate Procedure, 416 So. 2d 1127, 1129 (Fla. 1982) (interpreting Rule 9.331
to mean a majority of the appellate judges who participate in the vote).
298. FLA. STAT. § 35.06 (1990).
299. See FLA. R. APP. P. 9.331.
300. The chief judge of each of the district courts of appeal is selected by the members
of the court of that district. FLA. STAT. § 35.12 (1991).
301. The special en banc panel of Michigan's Court of Appeal has convened only three
times in three years. See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
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motion of a party.
The authors apprehend no reason why the Principle of horizontal stare
decisis should not be obtainable merely because Florida's appellate courts
are multiple rather than unitary. Division of the state into districts should
be retained for purposes of selection and retention of judges3 3 and for the
convenience of litigants. Despite retention of appellate districts, with
statewide horizontal stare decisis, the notion of "five balkanized districts
confederated into a loose Floridian union" 3 4 would tend to dissipate.
C. ConstitutionalAmendment, Supreme Court Rule, or Precedent?

There are several choices as to how the Principle could be put into
effect on a statewide basis. It could be done by legislation, constitutional
amendment, supreme court rule, or precedent.
The powers of our state government are constitutionally allocated
among the three branches in such a way that, although it does not enjoy an
exclusive power to make substantive law, the legislative branch exercises
lawmaking power that takes precedence over the lawmaking powers
respectively exercised by the executive and judicial branches. Nevertheless,
the executive and judicial branches have a certain amount of lawmaking
power that is reserved to them under the principle of separation of
governmental power, particularly in managing the details of the business that
they are charged with managing under the constitution.
It seems to us that putting the Principle into effect by legislative act
would leave the statute open to attack on the ground that it intrudes on the
judiciary's power to manage its own affairs. We believe that the principle
should be put into effect either by constitutional amendment, supreme court
rule, or by precedent-preferably by constitutional amendment as to the
basic Principle, and by supreme court rule as to the details.
1. The Eleventh Circuit's Method
of Adopting Stare Decisis
When the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was split into two circuits, the
Fifth Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit, one of the first tasks undertaken by
the new Eleventh Circuit was the adoption of a rule of stare decisis. The
judges had concluded that they wanted to adopt the Fifth Circuit rule that

302. Fla. R. App. P. 9.331.
303. See FLA. STAT. §§ 35.08, 35.10 (1991).
304. State v. Bamber, 592 So. 2d 1129, 1132 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991),jurisdiction
accepted, 602 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 1992).
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a prior decision of the circuit (panel or en banc) could not be overruled by
a panel, but only by the court sitting en banc.3 °5 One problem facing the
court was the question of whether the rule should be adopted by court rule,
or by precedent (i.e., stare decisis), a 6 There had been a great deal of
discussion about this problem, a°7 and the court finally decided to adopt the
3 8
Fifth Circuit rule by precedent in Bonner v. City of Prichard,
" the court's
first case.
The court rejected the idea of adopting the rule by an informal and
unrevealed consensus among the individual judges as being inconsistent with
orderly administration of justice.3" 9 It would not give fair notice to
litigants, courts, and government agencies of what to expect." ° Moreover,
without the "imprimatur" of judicial decision, such a rule could be upset by
changes in the composition of the court.3 '
Also rejected was the idea of adopting the Fifth Circuit rule of stare
decisis under the rule-making power of the court.3" 2 According to the
court, neither the authorizing statute nor the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure addresses the establishment of substantive law by the court.13
The judges of this court, when judges of the former Fifth Circuit,
maintained a distinct separation between their administrative and their
judicial functions. The substantive law of the circuit was established by
the exercise ofjudicial authority and procedural rules by administrative
action. We consider it inappropriate to decide what this circuit's
substantive law will be by any means other than judicial decision.3"4
Of course the options open to the Eleventh Circuit were not as broad

305. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11 th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
306. Id.
307. See generally Thomas E. Baker, Precedent Times Three: Stare Decisis in the
Divided Fifth Circuit, 35 Sw. L.J. 687 (1981) (citing most of the discussion prior to the
Eleventh Circuit's adoption of the rule).
308. Bonner, 661 F.2d at 1207.
309. Id. at 1210.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id. In section 2071 of title 28 of the United States Code, Congress authorizes
courts to prescribe rules for the conduct of their business. Bonner, 661 F.2d at 1211; see 28
U.S.C. § 2071 (1988). Rule 47 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure adopted under
authority of the statute, authorizes judges of the circuit to make rules of practice not
inconsistent with the rules. Bonner, 661 F. 2d at 1211.
313. Bonner, 661 F.2d at 1211.
314. Id.
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as the options under state law. As a practical matter, that court did not have
the choice of legislation or constitutional amendment.
2. The Problem of Adoption by Supreme Court Rule
The Florida Constitution, article V, section 2 (a), provides:
The supreme court shall adopt rules for the practice and procedure in
all courts including the time for seeking appellate review, the administrative supervision of all courts, the transfer to the court having
jurisdiction of any proceeding when the jurisdiction of another court has
been improvidently invoked, and a requirement that no cause shall be
dismissed because an improper remedy has been sought. These rules
may be repealed by general law enacted by two-thirds vote of the
membership of each house of the legislature. 15
It is arguable that by negative implication, this section forbids the
Supreme Court of Florida to use its rule-making power for the purpose of
creating substantive law. The provision speaks only of "rules for the
practice and procedure in all courts."'3 16 The Principle under discussion
would quite obviously be the creation of an entire body of substantive law,
and is itself a rule of substantive law.
In promulgating Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.331, providing
for intradistrict en banc decisions, the Supreme Court of Florida carefully
considered its constitutionality.3 17 Nonetheless, questions have persisted.
The argument is this: because article V, section 4(a), of the Florida
Constitution specifically provides that three judges shall consider each case
heard by the district courts, a different procedure cannot be authorized by
the promulgation of a court rule.318 Similarly, and perhaps a fortiori, a
supreme court rule establishing a special en banc panel crossing district lines
might be questioned.
Most instructive is the position of the Florida Supreme Court. In 1982
the Florida Conference of District Court of Appeal Judges petitioned the

315.

FLA. CONST. art. V,
316. Id.

§ 2(a).

317. See In reRule 9.331, Determination of Causesby a Dist. Court of Appeal En Banc,

Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, 374 So. 2d 992, 993 (Fla. 1979), modified, 377 So.
2d 700 (Fla. 1979).

318. See id at 995 (Boyd, J., dissenting); State v. Georgoudiou, 560 So. 2d 1241, 124748 (Fla. 5th Dist, Ct. App. 1990) (Cowart, J., dissenting), reviewdenied, 574 So. 2d 141 (Fla.
1990); Carroll v. State, 497 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (Hubbart, J.,
dissenting), review denied, 511 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 1987).
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supreme court to consider an emergency rule change to address practical
problems that had arisen in the en banc decisional process. 3 9 The chief
judges of the district courts asked whether one three judge panel could
overrule or recede from a prior decision of a three judge panel of the same
district court. 320 The supreme court responded, "[w]ithout addressing
possible constitutional problems," that it would not by court rule prohibit
overruling or receding by a three judge panel, but it admonished the district
judges to refrain from that action.2
Justice Ehrlich believed that "taking it upon ourselves [the supreme
court] to define intra-district conflict for the districts themselves would be
overreaching and presumptuous. 322 If that is so, then the supreme court's
taking it upon itself to forbid interdistrict conflicts might also be overreaching. The authors suggest that adoption of the Principle of horizontal stare
decisis by supreme court rule would raise issues of constitutionality that
need not be faced. Supreme court rules for implementing the procedural
aspects, once the Principle is adopted, would be the proper use of article V,
section 2(a) of the constitution.
3. The Problem of Implementation by Decision
The Supreme Court of Florida could do what the Eleventh Circuit did
by taking an appropriate case and putting the rule into effect in the process
of deciding that case. The problem with that method is that, although it
would have "the imprimatur of judicial decision,"32' 3 it would not carry the
same precedential weight as the Eleventh Circuit's decision did. There the
court was adopting a well established rule that had been in effect in Florida,
Georgia, and Alabama for decades (while these states were within the Fifth
Circuit). The Florida rule would be brand new, and could be more easily
upset by changes in the composition of the court simply because of its
newness.
4. The Preferred Method-Constitutional Amendment
Putting the Principle into effect and establishing the special en banc
panel by constitutional amendment would avoid many of the problems
3 19. In re Rule 9.331 Determination of Causes by a District Court of Appeal En Banc,
Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, 416 So. 2d at 1127.
320. Id
321. Id. at 1128.
322. Chase Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Schreiber, 479 So. 2d 90, 105 (Fla. 1985)
(Ehrlich, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1160 (1986).
323. See Bonner, 661 F.2d at 1210.
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suggested above, and would remove any questions as to the power of any
particular branch of government to establish the rule. Just as a constitutional amendment removed any question of the power of the supreme court to
"review a question of law certified" to it by a federal court,324 so would
a constitutional amendment remove any question of the power to require the
district courts to follow prior published decisions of any district court.
The Principle under discussion should be made a part of article V, section
4, of the Florida Constitution. The statement of the Principle should be
followed by the provision for special en banc treatment by judges from each
district. The section or subsection might read:
Any panel of a district court of appeal must follow the holding of [or,
the rule of law established by] aprior published decision of any district
court of appeal issued on or after [the effective date of this amendment].
When a panel of a district court of appeal states in its opinion that it is
following aprior published decision only because it is required to do so,
a special en banc panel of the district courts of appeal may convene to
rehear the case for the purpose of resolving the conflict which would
have been created but for this provision.
The amendment could also specifically allow for supreme court rule to fix
the number of district judges to sit on the special en banc panel and to
provide for the manner of their selection from among the district judges.
As for implementing the rest of the practice and procedures, the present
article V, section 2(a) should suffice.
Since the en banc procedure suggested here would amount to the
creation of a new court, article V, section 1, should be amended to include
such a court among those named in the first sentence. The first sentence
would then read: "The judicial power shall be vested in a supreme court, a
special en banc panel of the district courts of appeal, district courts of

324. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(6). In some early cases involving the certification
procedure and abstention, it was questioned whether a state's highest court had the power to
give what might arguably be an "advisory opinion." When the Fifth Circuit abstained from
deciding a case in order to get an answer to a state law question from the state courts, the
Supreme Court of Texas held that it was without power, under the state constitution, to
render such an advisory opinion. United Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 396 S.W.2d 855,
863 (Tex. 1965). The Supreme Court of Maine has refused to answer a certified question
which would not have disposed of the action. See In re Richards, 223 A.2d 827, 833 (Me.
1966). The Supreme Court of Washington approved the use of certification over the
objections of three of its justices who argued that it was unlawful under the state constitution.
In re Elliot, 446 P.2d 347, 354 (Wash. 1968).
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appeal, circuit courts and county courts.

[Vol. 18

32 5

V. CONCLUSION
To paraphrase the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Bonner v. City of Pri3 26

chard:

The state and federal trial courts, the federal appellate courts, the
bar and the public are entitled to a better result than to be cast
adrift among the differing precedents of other districts, required
to examine afresh every legal principle that eventually arises in
the state. This approach is inconsistent with the virtually
wholesale adoption in this country of English common law. A
multi-district court sitting en banc would be an available forum
for pursuit of a better rule and for rejection of any precedents
that should be no longer followed.32 7
Moreover, the Supreme Court of Florida would be available, as it is
today, to supervise the administration of justice in Florida.

325. At the same time, any question about the constitutionality of intradistrict en banc
decisions, as has been raised by some judges, could be settled by amending article V, section
4(a) (the third sentence) to read: "Three or more judges shall consider each case and the
concurrence of a majority shall be necessary to a decision." Intradistrict en banc consideration might still be desirable, for example, for cases of "exceptional importance."
326. 661 F.2d at 1211.
327. The Eleventh Circuit's version can be found id at 1211.
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APPENDIX "A"

STATE APPELLATE DISTRICTS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT: Alachua, Baker, Bay, Bradford,
Calhoun, Clay, Columbia, Dixie, Duval, Escambia Franklin, Gadsden,
Gilchrist, Gulf, Hamilton. Holmes, Jackson, Jefferson, Lafayette,
Leon, Levy, Liberty, Madison, Nassau, Okaloosa, Santa Rosa .......
Suwannee, Taylor, Union, Wakulla, Walton, Washington
Comprising the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 8th and 14th Circuits.

.

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT: Charlotte, Collier, DeSoto,

Glades. Hardee, Hendry, Highlands. Hillsborough, Lee. Manatee,

--

Pasco, Pinellas, Polk, Sarasota
Comprising the 6th, 10th, 12th, 13th and 20th Circuits.
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT: Dade, Monroe
Comprising the 11th and 16th Circuits.
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT: Broward, Indian' River,
Okeechobee, Palm Beach, St. Lucie, Martin

Comprising the 15th, 17th and 19th Circuits.
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT: Brevard, Citrus, Flagler,
Hernando, Lake, Marion, Orange, Osceola, Putnam, Seminole,
St. Johns, Sumter, Volusia
Comprising the 5th, 7th, 9th and 18th Circuits.
See FLA. STAT. §§ 35.01-043, 26.021.

i

FEDERAL DISTRICTS
NORTHERN DISTRICT: Court held in Gainesville, Marianna,
Tallahassee, Panama City and Pensacola.
MIDDLE DISTRICT: Court held in Fernandina, Ft. Myers, Jacksonvillc, Live Oak, Ocala, Orlando, St. Petersburg and Tampa.
SOUTHERN DISTRICT: Court held in Ft. Lauderdale, Ft. Pierce,
Key West, Miami and West Palm Beach.
See 28 U.S.C. § 89.
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